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Dividend Underreporting on Tax Returns
High Fraction of Total Dividends Traced to Tax Returns
IT has already been noted that because their distribution is so highly
concentrated, a significant proportion of aggregate personal dividend
receipts can be traced to tax returns even in those years when the
personal income tax did not reach most of the population. Thus, as
summarized in Table 15, over the four decades of our study the per-
centage of total dividends found on taxable returns was never lower
than 60, and most frequently ran over
Yeta closer look at Table 15 indicates that some of the variations
in this coverage ratio are not of the kind one would expect and may
therefore be significant. Why, with exemptions lowered, incomes rising,
and the number of taxpayers increasing greatly from 1941 on, did the
fraction of total dividends traceable to taxable returns decline notice-
ably?
Although the figures for taxable returns in Table 15 suggest this
question, they are not the most germane or convenient for attacking
it directly. Therefore, in what follows, the data for all returns will be
used—nontaxable as well as taxable—and the data on tax returns and
on aggregate dividends will be adjusted to make them comparable.
To this end also, the dividends received by fiduciaries and those paid
out to their beneficiaries will be handled differently and more precisely
than heretofore.2 For these reasons, items 4 and 13 of Table 16 below
1Thedata in Table 15 are from Table 1, and appear here for the reader's con-
venience.
2Before these adjustments were either unnecessary or impossible.
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Col. 3 as a
Per Cent
Year Dividends Returns of Col. 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1918 $ 3,518 $2,321 66.0%
1919 2,882 2,304 79.9
1920 3,211 2,549 79.4
1921 2,959 2,050 69.3
1922 3,044 2,283 75.0
1923 3,837 2,689 70.1
1924 3,811 2,849 74.8
1925 4,421 3,105 70.2
1926 4,721 3,533 74.8
1927 5,046 3,846 76.2
1928 5,485 4,094 74.6
1929 5,813 4,317 74.3
1930 5,490 3,861 70.3
1931 4,088 2,602 63.6
1932 2,565 1,640 63.9
1933 2,056 1,286 62.5
1934 2,587 1,670 64.6
1935 2,863 1,906 66.6
1936 4,548 3,477 76.5
1937 4,685 3,790 60.9
1938 3,187 2,481 77.8
1939 3,788 3,004 79.3
1940 4,043 3,472 85.9
1941 4,458 3,962 88.9
1942 4,289 3,531 82.3
1943 4,484 3,536 78.9
1944 4,673 3,669 78.5
1945 4,691 3,723 79.4
1946 5,784 4,561 78.9
1947 6,521 5,297 81.2
1948 7,243 5,923 81.8
1949 7,473 6,317 84.5
1950 9,208 7,544 81.9
1951 9,029 7,446 82.5
1952 8,954 7,280 81.3
1953 9,225 7,209 78.1
1954 9,839 7,622 77.5
1955 11,215 8,419 75.1
1956 12,132 9,427 77.7
1957 12,588 9,869 78.4
SOURCE: Col. 2: Table 1; cot. 3: Statistics of Income.
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TABLE 16
DERIVATION OF DIVIDENDS NOT ACCOUNTED FOR ON TAX RETURNS, 1958
(million dollars)
Source of Dividends Amount
1. Dividends reported by individuals on tax returns, including divi-
dends received from fiduciaries (estates and trusts) 9,058
Plus 2. Estimated dividends in "other income," I 040A returns 3
Plus 3. Dividends retained by fiduciaries and dividends included in the
charitable contributions of fiduciaries 375
Equals4. Dividends of individuals and fiduciaries accounted for on tax
returns 9,436
5. Dividends paid by domestic corporations 14,952
Minus6. Intercorporate dividends 2,829
Plus 7. Dividends received by individuals from abroad 179
Minus8. Dividends paid to foreigners 413
Minus9. Dividends received by nonprofit organizations 501
Minus10. Dividends received by noninsured pension funds 402
Minus11. Capital gains dividends paid out by investment trusts 327
Minus12. Nontaxable dividends 230
Equals13. Maximum estimate of dividends reportable by individuals and
fiduciaries 10,429
14. Dividend "gap" (line 13 minus line 4) 993
15. Relative dividend "gap" (line 14 ÷ line 13 times 100) 9.5%
NOTE: Source and methods of estimation appear in the notes to Table 23.
differ, respectively, from the dividends on taxable returns and aggre-
gate personal dividends in Table 15.
The difference between the aggregate amount of specific types of
income generated in the productive process and the totals of such types
of income traceable to tax returns has been a subject of interested
speculation over the years, particularly since the "democratization"
of the income tax. The reasons for this interest are obvious: the pos-
sible poor record-keeping, faulty memory, and dishonesty of taxpayers
and the potential revenue losses of the Federal Government on these
counts. Work on this problem has, of course, gone beyond speculation:
estimates of the gap have been made.3 And additional estimates for
S Pioneering work has been done by Selma Goldsmith (cf. her of Basic
Data for Constructing Income Size Distribution," pt. VI, Studies in Income and
Wealth,13,New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1951, and "Relation
of Census Income Distribution Statistics to Other Income Data," in An Appraisal
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dividends will be set forth in this section. But it is necessary to note
at the outset that some measure of speculation and uncertainty will
always surround such estimates. The author has essayed this task
twice before, and a good deal of the framework and language of this
section is taken from these earlier efforts, particularly the more recent
of them.4 But the estimates that follow, and the conclusions based on
them, differ from those in the two earlier efforts, in part because one
learns by doing, and in part because one learns from others. Other
investigators have noted and corrected errors and oversights in my
earlier procedures.5
The fact that the estimates change each time they are undertaken
and are considerably lower than in my two previous attempts suggests
an imprecision which it would be foolish to deny. Undoubtedly there
is still an intractable hard core of error. But in my judgment the
error is smaller than before, the present estimates are better than those
made earlier, and, with appropriate qualifications, conclusions can be
drawn from them. Moreover, as will be elaborated below, we are now
in a position to judge, under restricted assumptions, whether a "real"
change occurred in dividend-reporting propensities from year to year.
This chapter deals with a specific topic in a particular way. These
limitations should be stressed. It is a particular concept of under-
reporting which we seek to estimate, a concept which is several degrees
removed from both dishonesty and revenue loss. Part of the job, then,
is to make very clear what our measures mean or do not mean, and
of the 1950 Census Income Data, Studies in Income and Wealth, 23, Princeton for
NBER, 1958). More recently the Treasury has released estimates of the dividend
"gap" for 1955—1959. (See President's Tax Message Along With Principle Statement,
Detailed Explanation, and Supporting Exhibits and Documents, Committee on Ways
and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, May 3, 1961, p. 143.)
Unpublished estimates generously made available to the author have been under-
taken for 1952, 1956, 1958, and 1959 by Stan West, Associate Director of the Depart-
ment of Research and Statistics of the New York Stock Exchange.
4SeeDaniel M. Holland, Underreporting on Tax Returns," Journal
of Finance, May 1958, pp. 238—260, and idem, "Unreporting of Dividends and
Interest on Tax Returns," in Tax Revision Compendium, Committee on Ways and
Means, House of Representatives, 1959, Vol. 2, pp. 1397—1438. The estimates of this
latter paper were partially revised in testimony given before that Committee on
December 8, 1959; see Panel Discussion before the Committee on Ways and Means,
House of Representatives, Eighty-Sixth Congress, First Session, p. 768.
bTothe United States Treasury Department's Office of Tax Analysis staff, and to
Stan West, and Milton Leontiades, both in the Department of Research and Statistics
of the New York Stock Exchange, I am indebted for these corrections and an ex-
planation of how they went about them. Neither they nor any one else but me is
responsible for the errors of fact or interpretation that may still remain.
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to provide some idea of the range of error that attaches to them. For
it is only in the light of information of this kind that the findings can
be interpreted. That is why the procedures and methods of estimating
are spelled out in more detailed fashion than might seem necessary;
and that is why, also, several estimates have been undertaken where
there seemed to be legitimate grounds for alternative approaches.
The general question is the divergence between the total dividends
paid out by corporations and the amount of this type of income re-
ported on personal tax returns. This divergence is called the dividend
gap which, as we measure it, is made up partly of dividends that were
not and did not have to be reported under the revenue laws and
partly of dividends that were not reported but legally should have
been. As will be argued in greater detail below, while this latter
category cannot be precisely broken out, inferences as to its size and
growth or decline over time can still be made.
Specifically, this chapter covers three topics:(1) the size of the
dividend gap in 1958 and the revenue loss associated with it;(2)
changes in the gap over the last twenty-three years; and (3) evidence
on the income class distribution of underreporting. It concludes with
a note that explains our estimating procedures.
In discussing these topics, we depart from the measure of aggregate
dividend receipts used in Table 15 and in Chapter 1—i.e., the dividend
component of personal income as estimated by the National Income
Division (NID) of the Office of Business Economics of the Department
of Commerce—and substitute in its stead data directly from Statistics
of Income. Although not important for the broad purposes of Chapter
1, this distinction is useful for the detailed scrutiny of a residual, which
is our main concern in this chapter for a number of reasons. To the
best of my understanding, in making their foreign dividend flows
estimate the NID at several points used assumptions which involved
an overstatement of personal dividend receipts from abroad. This
means that in the aggregate individuals (and fiduciaries) are credited
with "too much" in the way of pretax dividends. Although this is
probably not a serious matter for the national income accounts, for
our measure it would tend to overstate the dividend "gap." And since
the gap is computed as a residual, this overstatement could be more
serious. Moreover, for 1958, a Statistics of Income figure is to be pre-
ferred because we can expect the NID 1958 estimate to be revised
once more, and it is better to use a consistent procedure for all years.
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Dividend Gap in 1958
By way of introduction to our data., we first examine dividend under-
reporting for one year, choosing the most recent year for which the
requisite data have been published in detail, 1958. The approach is
simple. By adding up various dividend amounts tabulated in Statistics
of Income (Volume 1) or estimated therefrom, we obtain an estimate
of the amount reported by individuals and fiduciaries on tax returns,
called R here. Similarly, by adding to (or in most cases in subtracting
from) the dividends paid out by corporations—again as published in
Statistics of Income (Volume 2)—a number of categories of dividend
flows that go to others than individuals and fiduciaries or that indi-
viduals and fiduciaries would not have to report, we arrive at a maxi-
mum amount that individuals and fiduciaries could be expected to
report on tax returns, called M here. The difference between M and
R is the gap, herein designated as G.
Table 16 shows the steps in our derivation of the gap.° The first step
is to start with dividends received and reported as such by individuals
on tax returns (including dividends received by individuals from
estates and trusts). The next step is to add the small amount of
dividends tabulated under "other income" on form 1040A returns,
add also the dividends retained by estates and trusts (fiduciaries) to
reach a figure of $9.4 billion of dividends of individuals and fiduciaries
accounted for on tax returns (line 4). The next nine lines of Table 16
show the derivation of M. Here we start with dividends paid out in
cash and assets other than own stock by domestic corporations, a total
obtained from corporation income tax returns.1 But some of this
dividend flow took place between corporations and never reached
individuals, and this (line 6) must be subtracted. Moreover, individuals
6Forthis purpose we use variant 2 (explained below) which in 1958 differed only
slightly from variant 1.
INotethen that our derivation of C is not circular. Al and R are in effect inde-
pendent estimates from different statistical sources. The main item in both M and
R is a tax return total, but in the one case (line 1) it is a total obtained from the
personal income tax returns; in the others, the aggregate figure (line 5) comes from
corporation income tax returns. Besides assuring that the measure of the gap is not
circular, the fact that M and R are independently estimated, and more particularly
the fact that their sampling variabilities are independent, permits us to set a
confidence interval on the gap (once the sampling variabilities are known). And
this, in turn, makes it possible to test for statistically significant changes in the gap
from year to year (discussed later in this chapter).
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received dividends from foreign corporations, which should show up
on tax returns (line 7). But, on the other hand, the dividends paid by
domestic corporations to foreigners would not be included in the data
tabulated from personal income tax returns (line 8). Two sets of institu-
tions that hold sizable amounts of stock but are not subject to personal
income taxation—nonprofit organizations (universities, foundations,
museums, hospitals, and the like) and noninsured pension funds—ac-
count for the subtractions of lines 9 and 10. The total on line 5 includes
capital gains dividends paid out by investment companies. We know
that they are to be reported as capital gains, and we assume they all
went to individuals and fiduciaries. Therefore they are subtracted
(line 11). Nontaxable dividends are, of course, not reported, and so
must be subtracted (line l2).8
All these adjustments result in an estimate of billion for the
maximum amount of dividends that could possibly have been reported
on individual tax returns (line 15). The difference between this total
and the $9.4 billion on line 4 (dividends of individuals and fiduciaries
accounted for on tax returns) we call the dividend "gap" (line 14).9
A detailed description of our procedures and the data for each year
from 1936 through 1958, arranged as in Table 16, appears in the note
at the end of this chapter.
In the main, our interest lies not in the amount of the gap for a
single year, but in variations in the gap over time, since this may
tell us something about possible changes in dividend-reporting pro-
pensities. But before turning to this, the meaning of the gap for 1958
(estimated at around $1 billion in Table 16) can be analyzed in detail,
which will help prevent confusion that might otherwise arise. Also,
of course, it is interesting to speculate on what might be the revenue
implications of a gap of this size.
8Threetypes of dividends fall into this category—liquidating dividends; dividends
of public utilities and, to a lesser degree, of real estate companies (primarily be-
cause of accelerated amortization and depreciation); and, since 1958, dividends of
small business corporations which elected to be taxed as partnerships ("tax: option"
corporations). The first two categories are considered to be return of capital, not
reportable as dividends. The third is included in the total on line 5, but would be
reported along with the rest of each owner's aliquot share of the corporation's earn-
ings and not as dividends.
9Moreappropriately, it should be called a dividend "gap," for as our table has
already made clear and the discussion in the next few paragraphs to follow will
amplify, there are numerous gap measures that could be devised. However, we
shall call it thegap,meaning thereby not the only gap but the one we have chosen
to use.
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The first qualification, which although obvious is frequently over-
looked, is that we should not present a single value for the gap but
rather a range within which the true gap might fall were it estimated
many times from different estimates of its component values. And for
this range we could merely state the expectation that the "true" gap
would be covered by the interval we set out, in nineteen cases out of
twenty, or ninety-nine out of a hundred, etc. For the gap is a random
variable and can take on a set of values different from the "true" value
because of sampling variability. More precisely, G is a random variable
because both M and R are random variables, and the sum (or differ-
ence) of random variables is itself a random variable. As noted in
going through Table 16, M and R each are the net resultant of sub-
tracting and adding estimated values. Sampling variabilities can be
placed around most of these estimated values with some precision.
This is because the sampling design of Statistics of Income is known.'°
Known sampling variabilities exist for the main components of M
and R. For R we have estimates of the sampling variabilities of divi-
dends reported by individuals and dividends reported by fiduciaries.
We also have an estimate of the sampling variability of dividends
paid by domestic corporations and intercorporate dividends, which
is the main component of M. We can go further and assign sampling
errors to the remaining components of M and R, and since these are
almost pure guesses we make them "large." As a matter of fact, the
relevant magnitudes are such that, even though 4= 41 +4,11
itturns out that 4dominatesthe results. Therefore,°Gis very close
10Thisdoes not mean that the desired or necessary sampling variability is easily
obtainable. The author is grateful to Ernest Engquist of the Internal Revenue
Service who gave general counsel and advice on this matter as well as estimates of
sampling variabilities of the main components of M and R.
11g2 = variance;o =standarddeviation. We have this expression for the variance
of the gap because the variance of a sum (or difference) of independently estimated
random variables is the sum of the variances. More specifically, our "model" in
principle is this:
1. M =M'+whereM is the observed value, M' is the true value, andisa




However we know that M' and R' are the true values. Thus each has a=0.
Therefore we can rewrite (3) simply as:
3.=+and
4.= +
Actually,in addition to sampling errors the data reflect biases, i.e., nonrandom errors
of measurement. A little more is said about this later.
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toFor 1958 we estimate have been about ±$41 million. Thus
the .99 confidence interval (which is set by a range of about
around the measured gap) for the gap would be million to $1.1
billion. The odds are 99 to 1 that this confidence interval covers the
"true" gap, if no bias is present or if biases cancel out.
Now for the second main qualification. The gap, as we define it,
is not a direct measure of dishonesty or evasion in the reporting of
dividends, nor is it the base to which to apply a marginal rate to esti-
mate the revenue loss due to the failure of taxpayers to report all of
their dividends. For, in addition to those dividends that should have
been reported but were not, the gap includes the dividend receipts of
those persons and estates and trusts who, because their adjusted gross
income was below the filing requirement of $600, did not have to
report for tax purposes.'2 It is not possible to determine with any pre-
cision the amount of this latter category of dividends, but a reasonable
estimate would be about $150 million.13
We conclude, then, that in 1958 between $750 and $950 million of
dividends (the gap of $1.0 billion, plus or minus $0.1 billion minus
the estimate of nontaxable dividends of $150 million) that should have
been reported on tax returns were not.
12Togo from the gap adjusted on this score to the tax base loss involves an
additional subtraction—the dividends not reported by persons who bad to report
but would have been nontaxable anyway.
13Thisestimate was arrived at as follows: Dividends received by low-income in-
dividuals not required to file returns were estimated at $107 million by the U.S.
Treasury for 1958 (see source cited in earlier footnote). In addition, some estates
and trusts did not have to file tax returns because their income fell below the
exemption levels. However, we are not interested in their dividend receipts per se,
but only those that went to individuals who did not have to file. For otherwise
the dividend receipts of such fiduciaries would show up on the tax returns filed by
the individual beneficiaries thereof.
In connection with their work for the National Bureau's Postwar Capital Markets
study, Eli Shapiro and Raymond Goldsmith, have estimated the assets of fiduciaries
not required to file, i.e., with a gross annual income of less than $600, as $6.3 billion
in 1952. They consider this figure to be an overstatement rather than an under-
estimate. Assuming that stock comprised the same fraction of their assets as it did
for the fiduciaries that did file (53.64 per cent), we get a figure of $3.4 billion of
stockholdings for fiduciaries in this group. Using a yield of 4.76 per cent (the yield
implicit in the Shapiro-Goldsmith multiplier of 21 by which dividend flows were
capitalized to arrive at stockholdings), we estimate that $162 million of dividends
were received by fiduciaries not required to file. Since net dividends (i.e., net cor-
porate dividends plus dividends received from individuals abroad minus dividends
paid to foreigners) in 1958 were about 30 per cent higher than in 1952, we may
estimate that about $210 million of dividends were received in 1958 by fiduciaries
not required to file. A generous guess is that between $40 and $50 million went to
individuals not required to file.
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To go from this figure to the amount of dividends directly related
to revenue loss, however, requires some additional adjustments. For
some of this underreporting is a venial sin, as far as tax revenue is
concerned, since some taxpayers who are required to report their
dividends but fail to do so would not be taxed on them anyway, be-
cause their exemptions and deductions exceed their adjusted gross
income, or because of the exclusion from taxable income of the first
$50 of dividends (on separate returns) or $100 of dividends (on joint
returns). Without any firm basis for making these adjustments, it seems
safe, i.e., more of an over- than an understatement, to put such divi-
dends at $100 million in This would mean an increment to the
tax base of between $650 and $850 million if all unjustified nonre-
porting of dividends had been corrected in 1958. Using the estimates
in Table 21 as a rough guide for the income class distribution of
underreported dividends, and applying the marginal rates that follow
from such a distribution, provides an estimated gain in income tax
revenue falling in the interval (see note at end of this chapter for
details). We conclude therefore that in 1958, the revenue loss from
dividend underreporting was on the order of $200 to $240 million.
It may be of interest to place the dividend gap in perspective by
comparing dividends with other types of income in this respect. For
this purpose, variant 2 of Table 17 is most comparable with estimates
for other sources of income. For 1957, we were able to trace 91.5 per
cent of dividends to tax returns. This can be compared with the esti-
mated coverage ratios for 1957 of 97 per cent for wages and salaries,
72 per cent for entrepreneurial income (a weighted average of 81 per
cent for business and professional proprietors' income and 45 per cent
for farm operators' income), and 42 or 63 per cent for interest.15 Thus
dividends are exceeded only by wages and salaries among the sources
14Inthe New York Stock Exchange estimates of the dividend gap prepared by
Stan West and Milton Leontiades, dividends received by nonfihing, nontaxable in-
dividuals required to file are estimated at $50 million. Our estimate is large enough
to cover both this and the $37 million they estimate for small, nontaxable estates
and trusts.
15Thewages and salaries and entrepreneurial income coverage estimates are from
C. Harry Kahn, "Coverage of Entrepreneurial Income on Federal Tax Returns,"
in Tax Revision Compendium, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Repre-
sentatives, 1959, Vol. 2, pp. 1443 and 1449. The lower interest estimate is from
Holland "Unreporting of Dividends and Interest on Tax Returns," in same source,
p. 1418; the higher coverage percentage for interest is an estimate of the U.S. Treas-
ury Department and is more detailed and more accurate than mine. It can be found
in President's Tax Message, 1961, p. 146.
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of income in tax return coverage. That dividends should have a high
coverage ratio is not surprising in view of their concentration in the
upper portion of the income distribution. But one would not expect
to find the proportion traceable to tax returns to be noticeably higher
for wages and salaries than for dividends. This is undoubtedly partly
explained by the fact that the tax liability on wages and salaries is
withheld at the source.
As a necessary caution in interpreting what follows, we take this
opportunity to point out the statistical hazards of our measure of the
gap. Even after the gap has been expressed in terms of a confidence
interval, it does not embody the "gospel" truth. For the statistical
model is really more complicated than described above. In addition
to sampling errors, the data also contain nonrandom errors, i.e., biases.
All we can do is say that the biases may be large or small; they may
cancel Out or reinforce one another. (Whatever their size, they do not,
of course, affect the variance of the gap.) It is our presumption, or
perhaps hope, that they are small, since most of the numerical weight
in our estimates comes from items subject to small or no bias, i.e., the
items whose sampling variability we know. And we also assume that
either they tend to cancel each other out or, if they reinforce each other,
being small, the distortion introduced is not great. If these presump-
tions (or hopes) hold, the gap could be a reasonable approximation of
the "truth," both as to level and variations in level for comparisons
between years. In all honesty, I see no real basis for determining
whether bias seriously affects the meaningfulness of changes in the
size of the gap between given periods of time. (Remember, we have
already taken account of random errors.) The difference between the
values of the gap under variants 2 and 3 is due solely to different esti-
mates of the dividends of nontaxable estates and trusts. In some years
the difference between variants 2 and 3 was larger than the sampling
errors, which suggests that sources of error other than sampling were
important. Yet it is not the mere fact of bias that is damaging. For
in comparisons over time a consistent bias is a virtue; absolute levels
may be wrong, but meaningful conclusions can be drawn from changes
in them if they are consistently wrong. Needless to say, since compari-
sons over time are undertaken, my judgment is that the bias is not
strong enough and inconsistent enough to preclude comparisons over
time.
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Changes in Gap over Last Twenty-Three Years
In addition to determining the present size of the dividend gap, it is
also of interest to study the movement of the gap over time. In one
sense this is essential since the gap is the residual of two sets of vari-
ables both subject to error and results for any one year must be
viewed with scepticism. But more than that, by examining the data
over a run of years, we can find out whether underreporting has be-
come more or less significant. For if it has tended to dwindle over
time, perhaps it isa. problem that will correct itself; but if it has
grown or remained at about the same level, perhaps more positive
action than heretofore taken will be necessary to correct it. Also, an
examination of the trends in underreporting may provide some in-
sight into the factors that affect it. Has underreporting increased when
the tax saving from not reporting increased (that is to say, when tax
rates rose), and decreased as taxes became less severe? Although our
data are not precise enough to provide an unequivocal answer to this
question, they will, nevertheless, permit some inferences to be drawn.
With these considerations in mind, estimates of the dividend gap
were prepared for 1936—1958. The results, summarized in Table 17,
enable us to examine variations and trends in the size and relative
importance of the gap. However, before turning to a discussion of
these results, some general remarks are in order.
Although the gap is a residual made up both of dividends that
should have been reported but were not and dividends that were not
reported because they did not have to be, and although it is impos-
sible to pinpoint these two components, nevertheless the data permit
inferences about the zealousness of stockholders in reporting their
dividend income. Thus, for example, if between two years the income
above which filing was required was lowered and the gap (particularly
in relative terms) rose, one can infer an increase in intentional under-
reporting (assuming, as seems reasonable, that memory lapse and poor
records are stable factors not subject to sharp variations over short
periods). For, other things being equal, the gap should have declined.
This same conclusion would follow if, with exemptions and filing
requirements unchanged, dividends payments increased and the gap
remained relatively as large or grew larger.16 But such inferences
16Inboth this and the previous statement itis assumed that there were no
startling changes from year to year in the way stock ownership and dividend receipts
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TABLE 17
DIVIDEND GAP, 1936—1958
AbsoluteGap (milliondollars) Relative Gap (per cent)a
YearVariant1Variant 2Variant 3Variant1Variant 2Variant 3
1936 519 272 12.0 6.3
1937 604 356 13.7 8.1
1938 325 150 10.9 5.0
1939 440 244 12.4 6.9
1940 130 —34 —24 3.5 —0.9 —0.6
1941 74 —107 —188 1.8 —2.6 —4.6
1942 412 141 299 10.4 3.6 7.6
1943 638 363 464 15.6 8.9 11.3
1944 67Ob 400b 575 15.6 9.3 13.4
1945 596 377b 371 13.9 8.8 8.6
1946 836 498 527 15.8 9.4 10.0
1947 721 400 490 12.1 6.7 8.2
1948 628b 260 434 9.5 3.9 6.6
1949 646 b 165b 349 9.5 2.4 5.1
1950 863 489 607 10.3 5.9 7.3
1951 735b 404b 548 9.0 5.0 6.7
1952 782b 523b 9.7 6.5
1953 1,126 779 13.5 9.3
1954 971 934b 11.3 10.9
1955 1,368 1,326 14.0 13.5
1956 1,154b 11.6 11.1
1957 961 906 9.0 8.5
1958 1,O5lb 993b 10.0 9.5
NOTE: Allchangesin the gap for variants 1 and 2 between one year and the next
are significant at the .01 level except where indicated byb. (Variant 3 was not tested
for significant annual changes.) The test used is described in the note on procedures
at the end of this chapter.
aTherelative gap is the absolute gap computed as a percentage of the maximum
estimate of dividends reportable by individual and fiduciaries (line 14 of Table 26).
b Change in gap between this and preceding year not significant at 0.1 level.
should be drawn only after due regard to the range of error that char-
acterizes our estimates. Any pronounced changes shown up by the
data are probably real, but the data will not support refined argu-
ments based on relatively slight differences. In what follows, therefore,
are divided up within the family unit. This is a reasonable assumption, for it would
have paid those rationally seeking to minimize taxes to make such arrangements
before the start of our period.
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we shall be concerned only with sharp and clear differences; small
variations that cannot be dissociated from the imprecision of the esti-
mates are neglected. To be more specific, in Table 17 the difference
between 1943 and 1944 is not significant at the .01 level; the difference
between 1941 and 1942 clearly is.
The presentation of three different estimates of the dividend gap
in Table 17 is due to three things: legitimate differences in concept,
the change in the way dividends were tabulated in Statistics of in-
come because of the tax relief provided this income share in the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954, and my good fortune in having the
advice of Dr. Joseph Pechman. Both the change in the tax law and
a judgment that it was one sensible way of defining the gap explain
the use of variant 1; Dr. Pechman's insight led to the development
of variant 2, as an alternative to my original estimate, now called
variant 3. The variants 17differamong themselves only in the way in
which the dividend component of the income of estates and trusts
(fiduciaries) is accounted for. In variant 1 the dividend component of
income from estates and trusts 18andthe dividends re-
tained by fiduciaries are added to individuals' dividends reported as
such. The sum of the dividend components of individuals' income from
estates and trusts and the dividends retained by fiduciaries is a narrower
base than that used in variants 2 and 3, as indicated by the bigger divi-
dend gaps provided by variant 1. But for comparisons over time, it is
not necessarily the level of the gap, but rather changes in the level, that
is of prime importance. Moreover, variant 1 has its advantages: it is con-
ceptually more appropriate for a comparison over time that includes
the years 1954—1958, and its estimates of fiduciary dividends, while more
narrowly based, are probably more accurate than those of variants 2 and
3 from 1940 through Variants 2 and 3 account for the dividends
of estates and trusts on the basis of what these entities per Se, whether
17Detailson the values used in their derivation appear in the note at the end
of this chapter.
18From1954 on, to get the benefit of the exclusion and credit, dividends received
from estates and trusts were broken out and reported and tabulated as dividends.
For the years 1936—1953 we had to estimate the dividend component of what was
reported under the heading of income froni estates and trusts.
19Theseare the years in which dividends of nontaxable estates and trusts were
not tabulated and had to be estimated for variants 2 and 3. But in all years in-
dividuals reported income from estates and trusts whether the estate or trust was
taxable or not, and while the dividend component of this income, as noted above,
had to be estimated up through 1953 for variant 1, this estimate is probably less
subject to error.
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taxable or not, reported on the returns they filed. Because they ac-
count for the dividends when received by the fiduciaries rather than
when some beneficiary of the trust reports having received them, vari-
ants 2 and 3 will show larger dividends associated with fiduciary in-
come than variant 1. Variants 2 and 3 will, and variant 1 will not,
include dividends paid out by fiduciaries to individuals not required
to report and to tax-exempt organizations. Since they will also include
dividends paid Out by fiduciaries to individuals who, although re-
quired to report, fail to do so, variants 2 and 3 overstate the degree
of reporting. Also, to the extent that estates and trusts not required
to report for tax purposes pay out dividends to individuals who report
them on their tax returns, variant 1 includes something not covered
by 2 and 3. The failure of variant1to include dividends paid by
fiduciaries to tax-exempt organizations is trivial. I estimate it for 1958,
for example, at under $60 million; in earlier years it was presumably
less.
The difference between variants 2 and 3 originates in the method
of estimating the dividends of nontaxable fiduciaries in the years in
which only the data for taxable fiduciaries were published—1936, 1937,
and 1940—1951. For variant 2, dividends of nontaxable fiduciaries were
estimated by using the ratios (or interpolating between them) of
fiduciary dividends to total personal dividends in the years for which
both taxable and nontaxable fiduciary data were tabulated—1939, 1952,
1954, and 1956. For variant 3, it was the ratio of taxable fiduciary
dividends to dividends of nontaxable fiduciaries in 1939 and 1952 that
was used as the basis of estimation. In developing these estimates, I
had initially used variant 3, but at the suggestion of Joseph Pechman,
tried the method incorporated in variant 2. While there is no way of
establishing which of these two variants, 2 or 3, is more nearly cor-
rect, the variant 2 values appear more "reasonable," and I shall, there-
fore, refer to them and the variant 1 values in discussing changes in
the dividend gap. In any event, the differences among all three annual
measures concern levels of the gap and not its pattern of movement
over time. 'When it comes to year-to-year changes (not levels), variants
1 and 2 tend to give the same picture, as can be seen from Chart 3. By
way of comparison, the coverage percentages for wages and salaries
are also plotted on the chart.20
20Thepercentage of wages and salaries accounted for on tax returns comes from
C. Harry Kahn, "Coverage of Entrepreneurial Income on Federal Tax Returns," in
Tax Revision Compendium, Vol. 2, p. 1443.
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With this run of estimates numerous comparisons are open to us,
and we start with a comparison that in one particular aspect is the
least equivocal. In1937, 1938, and1939 and again in1952, 1954, and
CHART 3




















1956, the dividendsof all fiduciaries,i.e., both taxable and nontax-
able, were tabulated and published. Special features of the 1954 data
make it inappropriate for the purpose at hand,2' so it is excluded in
what follows. For these five years, then, the variant 2 values are less
21Adjustmentswould be needed because the dividend exdusion and credit were
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open to question since the dividends of nontaxable fiduciaries did not
have to be estimated.
The early set of years (1937—1939) may be compared with the more
recent ones (1952 and 1956) first in terms of the scope and coverage
of the income tax, using 1939 specifically to represent the earlier years
and 1952 the more recent period. In 1939, filing requirements were
$2,500 or $1,000 of net income for married or single taxpayers re-
spectively, or $5,000 of gross income regardless of net; less than 2
million dividend returns and less than 8 million returns in all (both
individual and fiduciary) were filed; and about 40 per cent of total
adjusted gross income was reported on tax returns. In 1952, filing re-
quirements were $600 of adjusted gross income (whether married or
single); well over 4 million dividend returns and just under 57 million
returns in all were filed; and about 92 per cent of total adjusted gross
income appeared on tax returns.22 Then 1937—1939 should be com-
pared with 1952 and 1956 in terms of the coverage of dividends on
tax returns. For earlier years, the gap is between $150 and $350 mil-
lion, or between 5 and 8 per cent of total dividends; for the more
recent two years, the gap is about $523 million in 1952, about 6.5 per
cent of total dividends, and $1.2 billion, or 10 per cent of total divi-
dends, in 1956.
Here and in the rest of this chapter, as a general rule, we discuss
the gap as a single number instead of a range because the ranges are
clearly different, i.e., they do not overlap. For example, the average
gap for 1937—1939 is significantly different from that in 1952 and 1956,
by the test explained in the note appended to this chapter.
From what is known about the extension of the scope and coverage
of the tax system between the earlier and later periods, one would
expect, other things unchanged, that the gap should have become less
pronounced. But a gap in absolute magnitude several times as large
as the earlier one and in relative terms substantially the same if not
larger strongly suggests that, in fact, something did change. It is hard
to resist concluding that in these two later years dividend recipients
were not reporting their dividends as fully as in earlier years.23 A
22 Filing requirements and number of returns are from Statistics of Income for
1939, Part 1, PP. 122 and 298; Statistics of Income for 1952, Part 1, PP. 18, 70,
and 89. Adjusted gross income percentages are estimated by C. Harry Kahn.
23 There is no intention here of claiming specifically that those who reported in
1937—1939 and in 1952 and 1956 reported less fully in the later period. The state-
ment applies simply to dividend recipients in general at these two sets of dates.
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TABLE 18
EFFECTIVE RATES OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX FOR A MARRIEDPERSONWITH Two DEPENDENTS
ANDA SINGLE PERSON, AT SELECTED LEVELS OF NET INCOME, 1940-1954
Net
Income 1944 1946 1948 1952
Level 1936— and and and and 1954—
(dollars) 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1945 1947 1949 1950 1951 1953 1960
MARRIED, TWO DEPENDENTS
3,000— — 1.9 6.4 8.9 9.2 6.3 3.3 3.5 4.1 4.4 4.0
5,000 1.0 1.5 5.4 11.8 14.6 15.1 11.8 8.6 9.0 10.6 11.5 10.4
10,000 3.4 4.4 11.2 19.1 22.1 22.5 18.6 13.6 14.2 16.2 17.7 15.9
50,000 17.2 27.5 39.9 49.7 52.8 53.7 48.2 33.2 34.3 38.5 42.2 37.8
100,000 32.0 42.9 52.2 63.5 67.8 68.6 62.3 45.6 47.2 52.6 56.0 51.9
500,000 60.7 65.9 68.9 82.7 88.0 88.6 81.3 71.7 73.9 80.7 82.2 80.5
SINGLE PERSON, NO DEPENDENTS
3.000 2.3 2.8 7.4 15.7 19.1 19.5 16.2 13.6 14.3 16.6 18.1 16.3
5,000 2.8 3.4 9.7 18.4 22.1 22.1 18.4 16.2 16.9 19.3 21.0 18.9
10,000 5.6 6.9 14.9 23.9 27.8 27.6 23.5 21.2 22.0 24.9 27.2 24.4
50,000 18.7 29.4 41.8 51.6 56.1 55.9 50.3 46.4 48.0 53.5 56.9 52.8
100,000 33.0 44,3 53.2 64.6 69.7 69.9 63.5 38.0 60.8 67.3 69.7 66.8
500,000 61.0 66.2 69.1 82.9 88.4 88.9 81.6 77.0 79.2 86.0 87.2 85.9
SOURCE:The Federal Revenue System: Facts and Problems, Materials Assembled for the Subcommittee
on Tax Policy, Joint Committee on the Economic Report, 1959, p. 192.
ready explanation for the decline in reporting zeal lies in tax rates,
which of course were much higher in 1952 and 1956 than in 1937—1939.
Changes in tax rates over this period are summarized in Table 18. At
the lower income levels, effective rates rose by multiples of 5 to 10.
For the higher income levels the severity of the rise may be more
appropriately judged by the percentage decrease in income after tax
as shown in Table 19.
Persons in doubt as to whether to report dividends or not might
be more directly influenced by marginal rates. But these in general
tell much the same story. For example, a married man with two de-
pendents failing to report a dollar of dividend receipts at the $5,000
net income level would have saved 4 cents in 1939, but over 22 cents
in 1952; at $10,000, the tax saving would have been 9 and 25 cents,
respectively; at $50,000, it would have been 31 and 66 cents; while
at $500,000 it would have been 62 and 92 cents. Even more pronounced
at most income levels are the differences between 1939 and 1952 rates
for separate returns.
Parenthetically it may be observed from Chart 3 that the coverage
percentage for wages and salaries behaved in a fashion consistent with
(1) the pronounced decline in exemptions starting with the war, (2)
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TABLE 19
PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN EFFECTIVE RATES AND PERCENTAGE DECLINE IN INCOME
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a Notax in 1939.
the general increase in income from 1936 on, and (3) the institution
of withholding of almost all of the wages and salary tax liability in
1943.
In my judgment, this evidence on the change in the dividend "gap"
between 1937—1939 and 1952 and 1956 suggests that one response to
high tax rates has been an increase in the amount of dividends stock-
holders fail to report.24 Yet stockholders should not be singled out on
24 One rational response to increased tax rates would be the splitting up of stock
ownership and dividend income within the family unit to minimize tax liability.
This could be done by giving stock to minors or to a spouse. The tax advantage of
arrangements that change stock ownership from husband to wife or vice versa was
substantially removed by the introduction of income splitting in 1948. It is not
likely that to get a relatively small amount of dividends down to a nontaxable level,
the advantages of income splitting would be foregone. What happened between
1947 and 1948 suggests that, prior to general income splitting where there was a
parceling out of stock ownership within the family, the primary effect was to get
dividends down lower in the tax schethde, but not down so low that they did not
have to be reported. For while the number of taxable returns reporting dividends
(see Chapter 1) fell between these years by about 300,000, the increase of $760 mil-
lion between 1947 and 1948 in dividends reported as such on tax returns in relation
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this score. We concentrate on them because this study happens to be
concerned with dividends. But, there are good reasons to think that
also increased (or reporting failed to increase as much
as it should have) for some other sources of income.25
POSITIVE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN UNDERREPORTING AND LEVEL OF TAX RATES
It seems possible to go beyond the comparison based on two sets .of
widely separated years and discover a more general association be-
tween variations in tax rates and the size and relative importance of
the dividend gap, but with qualifications and exceptions. If, as al-
ready noted, a decline in exemptions or filing requirements is not ac-
companied by a constant or falling gap as we measure it, or if a rise
in exemptions or filing requirements is not accompanied by a constant
or rising gap,26 then other factors must explain variations in the
Variation in tax rates is one such factor. Another possible explanatory
variable to be discussed later is the relative change in aggregate divi-
dend payments.
The basis for judging that the change in tax rates has had an effect
lies in a review of the change in the gap from 1936 to 1958. It makes
little difference for this purpose whether we use variant 1 or 2, al-
though the timing of effects will, on occasion, show up differently
under each variant. For convenience again, a single value will be
used rather than the conceptually more appropriate confidence in-
terval. But we will only draw conclusions about changes in the gap
to the $650 million increase in total personal dividends is very much the same as
the $750 million increase in dividends reported as such on tax returns between
1946 and 1947 in relation to the $660 million change in total personal dividend
payments between these two years. Therefore we can infer that transfer of stock
ownership (and, hence, dividends) between married partners may have put some
dividends into lower tax brackets, but freed only a relatively small amount of divi-
dends from the necessity of having to be reported. As regards gifts to minors, over
the span of years under discussion here this had to be effected via a trust arrange-
ment. To the extent that such trusts had enough income to be required to file, their
dividend receipts are included in our estimates via dividends of fiduciaries. Recent
legislation, starting in 1954, has simplified this procedure, •and currently in all fifty
states transfer of stock to minors is permitted without the necessity of setting up
a trust. Another possibility, giving stocks to charities and foundations, if availed of,
would show up in our estimates in the dividend receipts of nonprofit organizations.
25 See, for example, the two articles by Selma Goldsmith cited earlier; Holland's
"Unreporting of Dividends Interest on Tax Returns" and C. Harry Kahn's
"Coverage of Entrepreneurial Income on Tax Returns," both in Tax Revision Com-
pendium, Vol. 2, pp. 1439—1459.
26 The expectation of a constant gap is a possibility under both these conditions
because of the high concentration of the dividend distribution.
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that stand up under the significance test described in the note at the
end of this chapter. Thus, we shall speak about a "sharp" fall in the
gap between two years only when a difference of this magnitude could
not be due to random variability in the data more than one time in
a hundred. We stress once more that it is only the distortions of ran-
dom errors of measurement that we eliminate in our significance test.
The biases could still affect the results, although it is our judgment
that they are not strong enough to determine the results. But there
is no way to prove this.
The initially high coverage of dividends on tax returns and the
tendency for the gap to decline from 1936 through 1941 follow from
the relatively small number of persons who received relatively large
amounts of dividends, and the sharp decline in exemptions and filing
requirements in 1940 and 1941. This latter can be summarized simply
by noting that in 1939 about 40 per cent of total adjusted gross in-
come could be traced to tax returns, and by 1942 the percentage was
81.2T As evidence of the increased scope of the income tax, we find the
percentage of dividends not traceable to tax returns declining, under
variant 1, by over 70 per cent between 1939 and 1940 and to slightly
below zero, according to variant 2. And we find the relative gap further
below zero by 1941 if we follow variant 2; under variant 1, it is cut
in half between 1940 and 1941. In absolute terms, too, of course, divi-
dends not reported on tax returns underwent a pronounced decline,
under both variants. The negative gap in variant 2 for 1940 and 1941
is not as remarkable as it may seem. It should be recalled that we
take as accounted for the dividends reported by fiduciaries whether
distributed or retained. Since we also estimate the dividend component
of the fiduciary income of individuals, some double counting that
leads to an overstatement of coverage (an understatement of the gap)
is involved here. In view of the general lack of precision of our esti-
mates, the negative gap should be taken to indicate no more than
that dividend receipts not traceable to tax returns came to a very small
total. In a sense, the 1941 results constitute a rock bottom figure for
the gap, the coverage of dividends on tax returns being so high that
one would not expect a decrease in the gap despite the further lower-
ing of filing requirements and the upward movement of incomes, both
of which led to a higher fraction of the .population and its income
receipts coming under the personal income tax. Nor would it be sur-
27In1939, less than 8 million returns were filed; in 1942 the number of returns
cxceeded 36 million.
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given the roughness of our estimates, if the gap increased
slightly under these conditions.
But it did not remain substantially unchanged. On the contrary, the
amount and relative degree of noncoverage on tax returns increased
substantially in 1942 and again in 1943. Compared with the dividend
gap under variant 2 of minus $107 million in 1941, there was a gap
of $141 million in 1942, and $363 million in 1943. (In variant 1a
similar rise occurred, from $74 million in 1941 to $412 million in
1942 and $638 million in 1943.) And all these changes in the gap are
statistically significant. In relative terms, variant 2 shows in sharp
contrast to a gap of below zero in 1941, a nonreported percentage of
over 3.5 in 1942 and close to 9 in 1943; variant 1 gives a rise from under
2 to over 15 per cent. This does not square with the following evi-
dence: Between 1941 and 1942, the number of returns filed increased
by 11 million; between 1942 and 1943 there was an additional increase
of 7million.(All the data for 1942 and 1943 are as tabulated in Sta-
tistics of Income, rather than adjusted for withholding. But this does
not affect their relevance for our purpose.)
Some of this rise in dividends not reported can be explained by the
special tax provisions for military personnel, but in any reasonable
estimate this could account for only a small part of the increase.28 Nor
28Thoseserving abroad were permitted, beginning in 1941 and ending June 15,
1948, to defer filing until six months after their return to the United States (Statis-
tics of Income,Pt. 1, 1948, p. 428). In 1942 an exclusion of $250 if single and $300
if married was permitted noncommissioned personnel. In 1943 this was raised to
an exclusion of the first $1,500 of military pay for all members of the Armed Forces.
But itis doubtful whether these provisions could explain much of the decline in
dividend reporting. The foflowing gives a rough idea of the relevant order of mag-
nitude. In late 1951 or early 1952 when there were 1.8 million persons in the Armed
Forces, it has been estimated that members of the Armed Forces who were "mern-
hers of family groups" constituted 0.3 per cent of the total number of individual
share-owners (Lewis H. Kimmel, ShareOwnershipin the United States, Brookings
Institution, Washington, i952, p. 98). This can be raised to 0.4 per cent to take
account o' those not members of family groups, and it can be assumed to apply
to dividend receipts from both publicly (large and widely owned) and privately
owned corporations as well as to stock ownership. We assume further that this same
percentage held in 1941 when the average number in the Armed Forces was roughly
comparable, and, finally, that new accretions to the military during 1942 and 1943
received 50 per cent more dividends than those in the Armed Forces in 1941, and
that none of these additions filed tax returns. (All of these assumptions work to.
ward overstating the dividends legitimately not reported by niembers of the Armed
Forces. This last one, for example, implies they were all serving abroad.)
Then we can attribute about 1point of the 6.2-point rise of variant 2 in the
nonreported percentage between 1941 and 1942 to dividends of members of the
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is it realistic to expect that much of this increase in the gap can be
explained by a sudden sharp increase in intrafamily shuffling of stock
ownership to minimize tax liability.29 Between 1941 and 1943 the rate
increases were severe and concentrated, of course, in a short span of
years.3° Apparently more taxpayers were pushed below the margin of
honesty as it became more profitable not to report dividend receipts
(as well as other sources of income). But this should not be viewed as
a purely mechanical response. In part it may be due to the shock effect
of the rapidity of the rate rise. The increase in the gap over this period
may also, in part at least, simply be one expression of the lower stand-
ard of conduct that characterized other areas as well during the war
years.3'
Armed Forces and between 1.5 and 2 points of the 5.3-point rise of variant 2 be-
tween 1942 and 1943 to this same factor. Thus, correcting for the Armed Forces, the
1942 percentage for dividends not reported would read 2.6 and the 1943 one be-
tween 7 and 7.5 (both as measured by variant 2). These are still very different from
1941. And our adjustment for dividends received by those in the Armed Forces is
undoubtedly excessive.
29 To the extent that this took the form of trust arrangements, the dividends
are in the main included in our figures. Other ways of arranging stockholdings prob-
ably were availed of earlier, since tax rates were by no means negligible before 1942.
Moreover, much of the reshuffling to minimize taxes involved not taking dividend
receipts out of the tax return population, but pushing them lower down the mar-
ginal rate schedule. That such had been the case is suggested by a comparison of
the data immediately before and just after the introduction of income splitting
for married persons in 1948, as noted in an earlier footnote.
30 Two factors are involved in the problem under discussion here. With every-
thing else unchanged, an extension of the coverage of the tax system would tend
to close the "gap," but an increase in rates would tend to open it by increasing
the tax saving associated with underreporting. Thus, apparently, the increased scope
of the tax system brought in more dividends between 1940 and 1941. than the rise
in rates between these two years squeezed out. But by 1941 most of the tax base
expansion had taken place, yet in the years that followed rates were raised further.
31 In reviewing an earlier draft o. this manuscript, W. Leonard Crum pointed out
an alternative to my explanation of this increase in the gap as a response to higher
tax rates:
"Another ready explanation' is that the increased reach of the tax system brought
in many new taxpayers, many of whom (lid not think they needed to
with reporting dividends, most of whom had not become over the years habituated
to keep records and report income from a variety of sources, and some of whom
regarded the new taxes thrust upon them as an undeserved burden which justified
any sort of evasion which was likely to escape discovery (and such evasion waslikely
to escape discovery in a period when the Bureau was swanipecl with the huge in-
crease in number of returns without a corresponding increase in the trained per.
sonnel for the enforcement of the act)."
(With the exception of this quotation and the question raised by Willard Thorp
mentioned earlier, numerous suggestions from persons who read this study in draft
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Yet, after the warwasover, dividend reporting did not revert to its
prewar level. In 1940, for example, with the income tax covering less
than three-fifths of the income received by persons, almost all divi-
dends showed up on tax returns; while in 1946, less than 91 per cent
could be so traced by variant 2 (about 84 per cent under variant 1),
although 90 per cent of all income was covered by the tax structure.
In 1936, when the income tax was still a select levy, the gap consti-
tuted 6.3 per cent of total dividends as measured by variant 2, or 12
per cent under variant 1, although oniy little more than a third of
the community's income was called to account for tax purposes. This
contrasts with the experience ten years later—a gap of 9.4 per cent or
15.8 per cent for variants 2 and 1, respectively.
Effective tax rates at given income levels reached a peak in 1944—
1945. Over the next four years, increases in exemptions, the lowering
of rate schedules, and, most significantly for married persons, the ex-
tension of income splitting to all joint returns (in 1948), all led to a
decline in effective rates. This decline was substantial; for married
couples, at least, at most income levels, by 1948 legislated effective
rates were somewhere between their 1941 and 1942 values; for separate
returns the decline was not as pronounced. (Of course, to the extent
that their incomes increased, taxpayers were subject to higher effective
rates than a comparison of legislated rates at a given income level
would indicate.) Along with this decline in effective rates we find that
the dividend gap fell in absolute amount under both variants. With
the aggregate flow of dividend payments increasing over time, there
was a more pronounced decline in the relative importance of the gap.
Between 1946 and 1949, the relative gap fell by more than 60 per cent
under variant 2; from 15.8 to 9.5 per cent as measured by variant 1.32
Thus it appears, especially if we focus on the relative size of the
gap, that the response to tax rates has been symmetrical—just as under-
reporting increased when rates rose, so it declined when tax rates fell.
But the fall in underreporting was not as vigorous as its earlier rise.
The gap remained relatively much larger than in 1940 or 1941.
Is this finding borne out from 1950 on? A glance at Table 18 shows
form have been adopted without specifically noting the suggestion or the person
who made it.)
32Thedecline over this period is all the more noteworthy because the increase
in exemptions and filing requirements from $500 of adjusted gross income to $600
in 1948 should, as we measure it, have led, other things equal, to a rise in the gap.
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a slight rise in tax rates between 1949 and 1950, more severe increases
in 1951, 1952, and 1953, and then a fairly pronounced fall in 1954,
with a continuance of rates at the 1954 level up through the present.
In general, the behavior of the dividend gap over this period does not
strongly confirm our conclusion that there is a relation between the divi-
dend gap and changes in tax rates. The relation is weak, and there was
a lagged response. Thus it was not until 1953 that the variant 1 gap
(on a relative basis) had become noticeably higher than in 1949; the
evidence of variant 2, however, shows a more immediate response to
tax rate increases.
The behavior of the gap between 1953 and 1955 does not support
our generalization. Here reliance is placed on variant 1 because, with
the change in tax treatment of dividends introduced in 1954 (the ex-
clusion of $50 for separate returns and $100 for joint returns, and the
credit against tax of 4 per cent of dividends above the excluded
amount) the variant 2 values for 1954 are adjusted estimates and quite
liable to be Out of line with the run of years up to that time. If we
examine the variant 1 gap, as measured in relative terms, we find it
falling between 1953 and 1954, which is consistent with the sharp de-
cline in tax rates. Surprising, however, is the rise in the gap between
1954 and 1955 (found also for variant 2) in the face of tax rates that
did not vary between these two years. Moreover, in the face of con-
stant tax rates there is a substantial decline between 1955 and 1957.
Quirks in our data could, of course, be a possible explanation of the
behavior of the gap over these years; so, too, could be some special
feature of the data since 1954 that our method has not adequately
adjusted for. Or it might be that taxpayers were reporting more
thoroughly. But there is another possibility suggested by these results.
As an alternative to our hypothesis that changes in the gap are re-
lated to change in tax rates, or merely as another factor affecting the
size of the gap, it could be that the dividend gap is positively associated
with sharp increases in the total volume of dividends paid out, either
because new people, unaccustomed to reporting (or even record-keep-
ing) were receiving them, or because, with a large increase in dividend
payments, the recipients thereof would have a higher tax liability and,
particularly if pushed into a higher bracket, their incentive to under-
report would be stronger.
But this simple conjecture is difficult to test, for to do so we would
have to be able to remove the effects on the gap exercised by (1) the
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extension of the income tax to more income recipients and (2) changes
in tax rates. We are able, however, to cite data that show a positive
association between pronounced changes in dividend payments and
percentage changes in the size of the relative dividend gap. From our
data we have picked out the periods of "sharpest" year-to-year change
in total dividend payments (our estimates of dividends adjusted for
comparability with tax returns) and the change in the relative dividend
gap, measuring both sets of changes as percentages. The results are sum-
marized in Table 20, the first row of which shows, for example, that
between 1938 and 1939 aggregate dividends increased by 18 per cent,
the relative dividend gap went up some 35 per cent under variant 1
and 63 per cent under variant 2.
On first glance, the evidence does not seem to support the hypothesis
that sharp increases in total dividends and increases in the dividend
gap are associated. Under variant 1, in four of the eight periods of
dividend increase the gap fell; for variant 2 this happened in three
instances. But a closer look provides limited support for the hypothesis.
The four periods of largest relative increase in aggregate dividends—
TABLE 20
COMPARISON OF PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN AGGREGATE PERSONAL AND FIDUCIARY















1938—1939 18 35 63
1940—1941 10 —43 215°
1945—1946 23 40 32
1946—1947 12 —14 —20
1947—1948 11 —13 —35
1949—1950 23 34 196
1954—1955 14 41 42
1955—1956 6 —7 —46
a Adjustedfor comparability with tax return data; see line 14 of Table 23 in note
at end of this chapter.
b A minus sign in cols. 3 and 4 indicates that a decrease in the relative dividend gap
was associated with an increase in aggregate dividend payments.
oThepositive percentage in this case came from a negative numerator and denom-
inator.
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1938—1939, 1945—1946, 1949—1950, and 1954—1955—all showed a posi-
tive increase in the relative dividend gap.
In closing this portion of our discussion of the dividend gap, it is
appropriate to repeat the need for caution in interpreting the results.
Only those findings that seem to stand out despite the imprecision of
our data and estimates have been set forth. Yet they remain more in
the nature of personal judgments than established facts. That there are
errors of estimate in our measure of the dividend gap cannot be denied.
The random errors we have taken into account. That there are likely
to be biases affecting the size of the gap cannot be denied either. Yet,
there are good grounds for holding that the distortion would not be
large enough to affect our conclusions on the behavior of the gap. Of
the adjustments made in arriving at the estimates of the dividend gap
(with the exception of fiduciary dividends which have already been
discussed and for which alternative estimates have been made), the
most sizable is dividend receipts of nonprofit organizations (see line
9 of Table 26 in the note at the end of this chapter). For the other
estimated entries, "big" percentage errors would have only a slight
effect on the gap. And our estimate of the dividend receipts of nonprofit
organizations appears to be well above two others that have been
Thus on this score our estimates make for a smaller gap than
would either of the two alternative figures just cited.
Income Class Distribution of Dividend Underreporting
Granted that taxpayers fail to report a slice of their dividend receipts
and that the size and relative importance of this slice has apparently
responded to variations in tax rates, it is also of interest to know, for
example, where the underreporting is concentrated and how much
of it might be uncovered by audit. An attempt to answer such ques-
tions is possible from the evidence uncovered for 1948 by the Internal
Revenue Service (then the Bureau of Internal Revenue), and very re-
cently for 1959.
33For1952 weobtaineda figure of $338 million. Selma Goldsmith putsitat
$200 million for that year (see Selma F. Goldsmith, "The Relation of Census In
come Distribution Statistics to Other Income Data," in An Appraisal of the 1950
Census Income Data, Studies in Income and Wealth 23; and the Federal Reserve
Board's flow of funds estimate is $100 million for 1952 (data from Federal Reserve
Board worksheets).
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THE 1948 DATA
The Bureau undertook a careful statistical investigation of the tax
returns filed in 1948—the audit control program (hereinafter referred to
as the ACP)—designed to "determine the size of the individual tax en-
forcement problem confronting the Bureau of Internal Revenue."
For a scientific sample of tax returns, errors (e.g., reporting less or
more than should have been reported) and the amount of tax change
associated with them were determined by audit, and from this infor-
mation estimates for the whole taxpaying population were made.85
These data on errors, including those made in reporting dividends,
and the resulting tax change were tabulated in four broad income
classes: under $7,000, $7,000 to $25,000, $25,000 to $100,000, and $100,-
000 and over. This makes it possible to analyze the income class dis-
tribution of underreporting as determined by dividing tax changes
disclosed by audit by the appropriate marginal rates. Since a number
of assumptions were necessary in obtaining these estimates, it is more
appropriate to present them as ranges rather than to use a single
figure that might spuriously suggest more precision than was possible.36
Table 21 shows our estimates for dividends uncovered by the ACP.
In the aggregate we estimate that between $90 and $179 million of
dividends would have been uncovered in 1948 had all returns been
carefully audited, which comes to between 1.8 and 3.6 per cent of the
amount of dividends actually reported by individuals. About one-third
of dividend underreporting was found in the lowest income class,
about half in the class $7,000 to $25,000, and the rest in the income
groups of $25,000 and over. More significant, however, is the relative
degree of underreporting among income classes. Reading from low to
high income classes, a general tendency appears for the amount and
relative importance of underreporting to vary inversely with income
class. Dividends discovered by the ACP 37 fell in a range of something
like S to 6 per cent of those voluntarily reported for the two lower
income classes, and between 1 and 2 per cent for the $25,000-to-$ 100,000
84 Bureau of Internal Revenue, The Audit Control Program, A Summary of Pre-
liminary Results, p. 3. A generally similar survey wasmadefor 1949, but no data
relevant to our problem are currently available.
85 The auditors and auditing procedures of the ACP were probably superior to
those generally in use at that time.
30 Details of the estimating procedures appear in the note to this chapter. The
estimates are based on materials made available by the Internal Revenue Service
in 1951.
37 This, of course, is our estimate from the tax change data released by the ACP.
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TABLE 21
ESTIMATES OF AMOUNT OF DIVIDEND UNDERREPORTING ANDFREQUENCYOF SUCH ERRORS
IN 1948 DERIVED FROM AUDIT CONTROL PROGRAM DATA
Estimated
Number ofNumber of Per Cent
Estimated Cot. 2 Under- Returns Col. 5of Total
Dividend as reportingReporting as Estimated
Under- DividendsPer Cent Errors aDividendsPer CentDividend
reporting Reported of (thou- (thou- of Under-
Income Class (million dollars) Col. 3 sands) sands) Col. 6reporting















$25,000to$100.000 14.0—28.0 1,508.4 0.9—1.9 31.2 166.9 18.7 15.6
$100,000andover 2.6—3.1 1,001.0 0.3—0.5 2.5 14.5 17.2 2.9
Total 89.6—179.1 4,970.9 1.8—3.6 490.7 3,321.9 14.8 100.0
a Includesboth returns on which dividends were reported, but too low, and those that should have
reported dividends, but did not. These latter, which should have been added to column 5, are not in-
cluded there, because there is no way of estimating them.
b The estimate for this class also covers errors on business returns with adjusted gross income of less
than $7,000 where gross receipts exceeded $25,000.
class, and between 0.25 and 0.5 per cent for the top income class. These
results seem reasonable. In the upper income classes record-keeping is
superior as a rule, the consequences of not reporting more serious, and
audit is a more likely possibility. This ties in with some of our pre-
vious remarks and also with Crum's comment quoted in an earlier
footnote.
The frequency of errors in dividend reporting was more prominent
than the rather slight amount of unreported dividends as estimated
from the ACP data. The estimated 490,700 returns with dividend
underreporting errors represented close to 15 per cent of the total
number of returns reporting dividends. For all but the lowest income
class, however, the percentage was above this, ranging between 17 and
20 and varying but slightly with income class (see column 7 of Table
21). Thus the practice of underreporting was less prevalent (relatively)
in terms of numbers in the lowest income class than any other, but
otherwise about the same for the remainder of the income range. To-
gether with the finding noted earlier on the relative importance of the
amount underreported—the ratio of underreported to reported divi-
dends tended to decline with income class—this suggests that individ-
ually underreporting errors were considerably more important in the
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TABLE 22
ESTIMATED ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE SIzE OF UNDERREPORTING AND OVERREPORTING ERRORS
FOR RETURNS WITH MAJOR AND MINOR ERRORS IN DIVIDENDS, 1948
Returns with Major Errors in Dividends
Average Errors as
Relurns with Minor Errors in Dividends
Errors as
Amount of NumberEstimated Per CentNumberEstimated Per Cent
Dividends of Average of Amount of Average of Amount
ReportedReturns Error ReportedReturns Error Reported
Income Class (dollars)(thous.) (dollars)Col. 4 ÷ Col. 2(thous.) (dollars)Col. 7 ÷ Col.2














825,000 to $100,000 7,939 12.2 426—852 5.4—10.8 19.0 542—1,084 6.8—13.6
$100,000 andover 66,732 1.0 1,000—2,000 1.5—3.0 1.5 1,334—2,667 2.0—4.0
OVERREPORTING ERRORS
Under $7,000 a 265 7.6 39—78 14.7—29.8 13.8 77—154 29.0—58.0
$7,000 to$25,000 978 8.1 155—310 15.8—31.6 14.8 97—193 9.9—19.8
$25,000 to 3100,000 7,939 1.8 231—461 2.9—5.8 3.3 341—682 4.3—8.6
$100,000 and over 66,732 0.2 700—1,400 1.0—2.0 0.4 688—1,375 1.0—2.0
Form 1040 returns only. Thus number of returns with underreporting error in this class differs from
the number in Table 21.
b Includes business returns with adjusted gross income of less than $7,000, where gross receipts ex-
ceeded $25,000.
lower classes.38 One way of gauging their importance is to compare
the estimated average amount uncovered by the ACP with the average
amount of dividends initially reported in each of the four broad in-
come classes. Such a comparison is made in Table which is lim-
ited to 1040 returns.
On the average the underreporting error in the two lower income
classes was serious. In the under-$7,000 class, its value probably ranged
between approximately half to almost the whole average amount of
38 "Lower" is defined with reference to the four income classes into which the
ACP data are classified, rather than the usual income distributions for which the
topmost classes would be close to the upper limits of our "lower" classes.
39 Note that the classifications of major or minor error in dividend reporting is
not related to the size of the dividend error, but to its importance relative to all
errors made by the taxpayer. More specifically a major dividend error as defined
by the ACP "means that (a) the error in dividends... wasresponsible for the
largest portion of change in adjusted gross income and (b) the change in adjusted
gross income was responsible for a larger portion of the tax change than either
exemption change, or personal deduction change, or mathematical error." All other
dividend errors were classified as minor. The fact that minor errors were at least
as large as major errors means that the minor errors occurred on returns generally
more error-prone and with a larger total tax change than returns with major errors.
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dividends reported for returns with minor errors in dividends, some-
what below this for returns with major errors. In the income class
$7,000 to $25,000, dividend errors averaged between one-quarter and
two-thirds of the average amount reported. In the two upper income
classes, judged this way, dividend underreporting errors were much
less important—between 1 and 10 per cent. Note also the relatively
large average overreporting error (lower half of Table 22), which
also declines in importance relative to reported dividends moving up
the income scale. This suggests that some of the underreporting of
dividends, too, can be laid to carelessness and poor record-keeping
rather than purposeful evasion. But this is not the whole story: over-
reporting errors averaged only half as much as or less than under-
reporting errors, not to mention the much greater frequency of under-
reporting errors.4° The number of returns wi.th dividend error and
tax decrease was only about 11 per cent of the number of returns with
dividend error and tax increase.
This section should not be concluded without some reference to the
dividend gap discussed earlier. For 1948 we estimated the gap at about
$260 million. (This is the variant 2 value which is much lower than
the variant 1 or 3 values.) If we take accOunt of the variance of the
gap, it might better be described as falling in the interval of $190 to
$330 million. By reasoning similar to that used earlier for 1958, about
$100 million of this might be explained as dividend receipts of those
not required to file. (This allows for the $40 million reported in classes
below the filing requirement.) The rest presumably was pure under-
reporting. Thus somewhere between $90 and $230 million were not
reported. And our estimate of the aggregate amount of unreported
dividends based on the ACP data was between $90 and $179 million.
Thus, the two measures of unreported dividends correspond quite
closely. However, were we to use the variant 1 measure of the gap
(since, as noted earlier, variant 2 tends for several reasons to under-
state it), there would be no such close congruence between the gap as
we estimate it and aggregate underreporting as estimated from the
ACP data. For this latter figure would fall far short of the $500 to
$600 million of nonreported dividends provided for 1948 by variant I
(adjusted for dividends of those not required to file). Variant 3 also
yields a larger figure for the gap than is obtained from the ACP data.
40Thedata in Table 21 are net—i.e., the excess of estimated underreported divi-
dends over estimated overreported dividends.
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The ACP was designed to discover only the underreported dividends
of those who filed tax returns. Some of the difference between our esti-
mates and those derived from the ACP could be due to dividend re-
ceipts of persons who intentionally did not file.
THE DATA FOR 1959
The Internal Revenue Service's interest in dividend reporting (or
nonreporting)errors did not, of course, stop with 1948. But nofind-
ings of any further investigations it may have undertaken were re-
leased until March 1961, when data for 1958 and 1959 were made
public. In September 1961 a supplement to the March report based
on audited data was released.
For each of these two years a survey of underreporting was made.
A random sample of information returns (form 1099 returns which
must be filed by corporations for any dividend payment of $10 or
more) was chosen, and then matched against the recipients' income
tax returns to see if the dividends were reported.4' These two surveys
are more pertinent than the 1948 data because they represent a more
direct estimate of the amount of underreporting and they are more
current. But since they are more direct estimates and since they have
$25,000 and over as their highest income class, they are not strictly
comparable with the 1948 data. Moreover, while the sample was ran-
domly chosen from the body of 1099 returns, it is not known to what
degree the distribution of 1040 returns determined by the sample of
1099 returns approximates the distribution of all dividend recipients.
The 1948 ACP sample was chosen to represent the whole distribution
of taxpayers. Therefore we report the 1959 data in their own terms.
This does not mean that the findings cannot be compared at all; rather
it suggests that only broad comparisons can be made.42
The data in Table 23 show the 1959 survey findings on. the per-
Thisis a rough statement of the procedure, sufficient for the present pur-
pose, but it glosses over numerous details and technicalities.
42Thedescription of the sample that follows is drawn from Taxpayer Behavior
in the Reporting of Dividends and Interest in Income Tax Returns for 1958 and
1959, a report by Mortirner M. Caplin, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, March
10, 1961. But the data themselves, supplied by the Internal Revenue Service at a
later date, are based on the audited survey results, some of which appear in "Sup-
plement to Report on Taxpayer Behavior in the Reporting of Dividends and In-
terest in Income Tax Returns for 1958 and 1959," Mortimer M. Caplin, Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, August 30, 1961. Because only the 1959 survey results
were audited, our discussion here is limited to the 1959 data.
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TABLE 23
PERCENTAGE OF TAXPAYERS IN SAMPLE WHO FULLY REPORTED INFORMATION
DOCUMENT DIVIDENDS ON THEIR INCOME TAX RETURNS, 1959
(form 1040 returns only)
Adjusted Gross Percentage of
Income Class Taxpayers
Under $5,000 70
$5,000 to $10,000 69
$10,000 to $25,000 73
$25,000 and over 80
Total 71
SOURCE: Internal Revenue Service. These percentages are based on audited data
and are, therefore, not the same as those in Caplin, Taxpayer Behavior.
centage of the total number of dividend recipients in each adjusted
gross income class who reported all the dividends accounted for in the
information documents. For the whole sample, 71 per cent were full
reporters in 1959. Looking for income class differences, one finds that
the highest class, $25,000 and over, had a higher percentage of full
reporters than the The 1959 results, therefore, seem different
on this score from the results in column 7 of Table 21, which suggests,
except for the lowest income class, substantially the same percentage
of underreporters in all income classes.
For 1959, data are also available on the percentage in the sample
who reported fully, arrayed by size of reportable dividends. The re-
sults, given in Table 24, present a somewhat different picture from
that obtained from the income class percentages. For the lowest divi-
dend class has a smaller percentage of full reporters than any other.
But since such dividends, if reported, would be excluded from ad-
justed gross income anyway, it is understandable that there would not
be as many full reporters relatively here as in the other dividend classes.
The steady rise in the fully reported percentages reaching up the in-
43Itshould be remembered that these surveys' top income class is quite low, given
the high concentration of dividends. More pronounced differences in the fully re-
porting percentage might show up at some point higher in the income scale. The
fact that the total percentage was the same as all the low income class percentages
does not necessarily preclude this possibility because the dividend recipients this
high up would be few in number.
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TABLE 24
PERCENTAGE OF TAXPAYERS FULLY REPORTED INFORMATION DOCUMENT
DIVIDENDS, BY SIZE OF REPORTABLE DIVIDENDS, 1959






$50 to $100 69
$100 to $500 72
$500 to $1,000 74
$1,000 and over 75
Total 71
SOURCE: Internal Revenue Service.These percentages are based on audited data
and are, therefore, not the same as those in Caplin, Taxpayer Behavior.Cases where
reportable dividends totaled less than $50 were not audited since the amount involved
was exceeded by the allowable dividend exclusion.
TABLE 25
PERCENTAGE OF INFORMATION DOCUMENT DIVIDENDS REPORTED
ON INCOME TAX RETURNS, 1959






$5,000 to $10,000 89
$10,000 to $25,000 93
$25,000 and over 98.
Total 95
SOURCE: Internal Revenue Service. These percentages are based on audited data
and are, therefore, not the same as those in Caplin, Taxpayer Behavior.
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come scale is consistent enough to be accepted. In the light of the
observation in footnote 44, which applies here also, however, the slight
difference between the percentages in the $500-to-$l,000 and $1,000-
and-over classes suggests that possibly, over some range in the over-
$1,000 class, the percentage dips below 75 and then rises above it
further up the dividend size scale.
More pertinent to the problem of this chapter than the number
(or percentage) not fully reporting is the amount of dividends not re-
ported that should have been. The surveys' findings on this subject
are summarized in Table 25. With the exception of the lowest income
class, the results follow a reasonable and familiar pattern, with the
reporting percentage rising with income class.44
Effect of Voluntary Compliance Campaign on Dividend Gap
One general conclusion of this chapter has been that a dividend gap
of some size which cannot be explained away by imputations to non-
taxable institutional and individual stockholders has existed over long
periods of time. Many would hold that some remedy is in order. At
least three possibilities exist for dealing with the problem: (1)in-
creased auditing of dividend returns, (2) specific reminders that divi-
dend receipts are taxable and notification to the stockholder that in-
formation returns on dividend payments to him are in possession of
the Internal Revenue or (3) instituting withholding of tax
liability on dividend payments. Evaluation of the administrative feasi-
bility and costs of these possibilities lies beyond the scope of our study.
But, with reference to the data in the last section and information
of a similar nature, a limited evaluation of the effectiveness of methods
(1) and (2) can be made, for since the latter part of 1959, the Treasury
Department has consciously sought to improve dividend reporting by
these two devices—increased auditing and wider publicity—and has,
in addition, on several occasions evaluated the efficacy of these attempts.
In 1959, motivated by a study of the gap for 1956 generally similar
to the one described here for 1958, the U.S. Treasury Department in-
There are good reasons to hold that the 95 per cent reporting for the whole
sample does not permit us to conclude that the dividend gap is only 5 per cent.
(See the next section of this chapter.)
Currently any dividend payments in excess of $10 per annum must be reported
to the Internal Revenue Service on form 1099. Many corporations, however, find
it simpler to report all such payments no matter how small.
91Dividends Under the Income Tax
stituted a program to increase voluntary reporting of dividends and
interest by taxpayers. The nature of the program and what it appears
to have accomplished at an early date are best described by the De-
partment itself.46
Following the completion of the 1956 survey, it was determined
to take action in two separate areas to improve the reporting of the
amounts received by the recipients of dividends and interest.
All payers of $10 or more in dividends and $600 or more of in-
terest must make reports of such payments to the Revenue Service
on Form 1099 or other information documents. In every Revenue
District a broadened and accelerated program of matching these
forms with the returns of individual taxpayers is actively in prog-
ress. A vigorous follow-up audit will be made in cases where a re-
turn has not been filed or where additional assessments of tax and
penalty are indicated by the information secured from the infor-
mation documents.
The second half of the program to insure proper reporting is the
cooperative information program undertaken by the Revenue Serv-
ice and by the payers of dividends and interest. Many of you par-
ticipated in this program. More than 75 million special notices were
mailed to recipients of dividends and interest. This distribution was
supplemented by a coordinated information campaign using news-
papers, magazines, radio and television. Excellent cooperation was
given in this area by tens of thousands of corporations, banks and
individuals active in the dividend and interest field.
Written and oral communications have gone from the national
associations to their state and local members urging full coopera-
tion. Articles have been published in association journals, financial
journals, monthly newsletters, and other trade publications. Posters
have been prepared and distributed. In some areas in this state some
of your members joined with other financial institutions in spon-
soring newspaper ads on the subject.
We know from the many comments we have received and from
the many questions answered by our District Offices during the 1960
filing period, that the voluntary information program has been
most successful. It is, of course, somewhat early to appraise fully
46 The following paragraphs are taken from a speech delivered by Under Secretary
of the Treasury Fred C. Scribner, Jr., at the Annual Convention of the Maine
Bankers' Association, June 24, 1960.
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the extent of the increased reporting of dividends and interest since
only a little more than two months has elapsed since the filing date
for the returns covering the year 1959.
However, some measure of the program's success has been oh
tamed from checking some 8,000 individual cases selected as the
result of a screening of approximately 100,000 cases.
In each of the 8,000 cases the information returns indicated that
the taxpayer in the tax year 1958 had received $300 or more of
dividends and interest. The documents ind.icated the possibility of
a failure on the part of the taxpayer to report in full. We have now
received audit reports on 1,340 of the 8,000 cases selected. The num-
ber of taxpayers in this group of 1,340 who failed to report dividend
income or reported only in part dropped from 777 in 1958 to 407
in 1959, or a decrease of 48 per cent in the number of taxpayers
underreporting dividends received. The amount of unreported divi-
dends income from these 777 taxpayers decreased approximately
42 per cent from 1958 to 1959.
It is our belief that a substantial part of this increase has resulted
from the voluntary program of cooperation in the dividend and
interest field, coupled as it is with the stepped-up enforcement pro-
gram. The Treasury Department greatly appreciates the many steps
taken by payers of dividends and interest, steps in many instances
involving substantial expenditures, to bring to the attention of
recipients of dividends and interest income their obligation to re-
port such income fully on their tax returns.
More recent information on the success of the program was re-
ported in The New York Times of October 9, 1960.
On the basis of the admittedly limited sample, Dana Latham,
Tax Commissioner, says the educational program has been amaz-
ingly successful.
As of last Tuesday, the Treasury had audit reports on 1,801 of the
selected cases. The Commissioner said that, based on the 1,801 cases,
the number of persons failing to report dividends fully in 1958 de-
creased by 50 per cent in 1959. The unreported dividend income
decreased by 45 per cent.
Following close on the heels of this evidence came some additional
information that appeared to confirm that sizable inroads had been
made on the dividend gap. The Treasury reported in a press release
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dated December 22, 1960, that analysis of the returns for the year 1959
filed during 1960 "show significant increases over the two prior years
in the number of returns reporting interest and dividends. There were
also sizable increases in the amount of dividends and interest reported."
While these were preliminary estimates, the Treasury held that, on
the basis of past experience, they were likely to stand at substantially
their estimated level. Moreover, the contention was that this improve-
ment indicated "a considerable degree of success for the first year of
the Treasury's concerted drive to improve taxpayer reporting of divi-
dend and interest income."
There is no basis for making as refined an estimate of the gap for
1959 as for earlier years since some of the basic data are not yet avail-
able. Nonetheless we can project the 1958 data with sufficient assurance
to assert that, if the preliminary estimate released in December 1960
for dividends reported on tax returns was correct, then the gap had
indeed declined. Making some rough projections and using the pre-
liminary figure for dividends reported by individuals on tax returns
of $10.3 billion for 1959, one gets a decline in the gap (very rough of
course) on the order of one-half.
Thus, given what was known at the end of 1960, it did appear that
the dimensions of the dividend gap were considerably smaller in 1959
than in 1958. We should not, of course, stop with a single value esti-
mate, since, as emphasized above, the gap is most appropriately inter-
preted as falling within a specified range. But, for reasons that will
become clear in the next several paragraphs, this refinement is not
necessary.
In essence, what has happened since is that new and more accurate
estimates have become available. One such set of data has been alluded
to and discussed in the preceding section of this chapter—the random
sample of dividend returns (form 1099) matched with personal income
tax returns (form 1040) of the dividend recipients. Clearly this latter
sample is drawn from a more appropriate universe for measuring un-
derreporting and changes therein than a sample obtained by picking
taxpayers for whom "the documents indicated the possibility of a fail-
ure on the part of the taxpayer to report in full" in 1958. And this
was how the sample for the survey whose results were reported by
Under Secretary Scribner in his speech of June 24, 1960, quoted above
was obtained. This latter basis of choice partakes of the "regression
fallacy." it chooses people who have a given attribute in one year and
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seeks to find to what extent they have that same attribute in the
succeeding year. To the degree that the attribute is random, it will
not show up as pronouncedly in the second year as in the first.
As pointed out by the present Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
Mortimer Caplin, the earlier survey was subject to two limitations that
restricted the inferences that could be drawn from In the Com-
missioner's judgment there was no improvement in reporting between
1958 and 1959. He has concluded that "there was no material change
in the degree of compliance of identical taxpayers between 1958 and
1959. The relatively small number of taxpayers who improved in their
reporting in 1959, after the educational campaign, was roughly bal-
anced or perhaps even over-balanced, in the case of dividends, by the
number whose reporting deteriorated." 48
As regards the aggregate amount of dividends reported by individ-
uals on tax returns, the earlier and tentative estimate of $10.3 billion,
admittedly less accurate than the estimates prepared for Statistics of
income, should be replaced by the Statistics of Income figure of $9.7
billion which has since been released.49 In view of this evidence, it
seems fairly certain that in 1959 at least, the voluntary compliance
campaign had not resulted in a substantial reduction in the absolute
amount of dividends not reported.
This may be why the Federal Government has recently turned its
attentionto another method of improving taxpayer compliance.
President Kennedy, in his tax message of April 20, 1961, asked Congress
to institute withholding on dividends (and some items of interest).
At the time of writing, this is where the matter stands.5°
On the face of it, the Internal Revenue Service sample survey for
47. ,."First,this tabulation was,inno sense, a survey of a representative sample
oftaxpayers, butwas limitedtotaxpayers where a relatively large potentialtaxde-
ficiencyfor 1958 was anticipated. Second, the methods of selection and audit intro-
duced certain distinct biases into the results, so that we were much more apt to
include in the program taxpayers who had improved in their reporting of dividends
and interest than taxpayers whose reporting had declined. In short, the program
was simply a by-product of our regular audit activity designed to check up on
potentially flagrant cases ononreporting, and to bring in revenue. The results
were reported for information purposes, hut the study was not designed to provide
a measure of the improvement among taxpayers generally in the reporting of divi-
dends and interest." (Commissioner Caplin in his report of March 10,1961, to
Senator Byrd as quoted in President's Tax Message, p. 165.)
to Report, p. 1.
49Statisticsof Income, 1959, Part 1 (preliminary), p. 2.
50Afurther discussion of these points and estimates of the (lividenci gap from
1955 through 1959 appears in President's Tax Message.
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1959 appears to open our usual measure of the gap to suspicion, since
the survey suggests a dividend gap of 5 per cent, while our estimate
was 10 per cent for 1958 and should be about the same for 1959. But
there are a number of features wherein the two procedures are not
comparable. Rather than spell them out, we present Commissioner
Caplin's conclusions on this
Estimates of the overall nonreporting gap have been made by the
Treasury Department, as well as by others, that show the total
amounts of dividends and interest omitted from tax returns. Our
sample surveys give specific evidence of nonreporting by taxpayers,
but cannot be expected to provide overall gap estimates, especially
when they are based on a rather small sample. Even though ours
was a representative sample, it was based on only 3,000 taxpayers
in each survey, in 9 Internal Revenue districts, and it was not a
"probability sample" susceptible of being "blown" up to represent
all taxpayers.
Summary of Findings on Dividend Underreporting
We end this chapter with a brief summary of the highlights of our
survey of dividend coverage on tax returns, but the numerous qualifi-
cation and caveats that attach to these findings and have been dis-
cussed above must be kept in mind in interpreting the results.
1. In the most recent year for which systematic estimates could be
made—1958—a sizable gap existed between the dividends paid out to
individuals and fiduciaries and the dividends they reported on tax
returns. While the amount of such dividends is difficult to pinpoint,
they appear to have run at about $1.0 billion in that year, or about
10 per cent of the reportable amount.
2. Not all the dividends that were not reported meant a loss of
revenue to the Treasury because some dividends went to those who
did not have to file or whose exemptions and deductions exceeded
their income and would still have even if they had reported all their
dividends. Adjusting as well as possible for these factors, we estimated
the revenue loss due to unreported dividends at between $200 and
$240 million in 1958. This may seem a small amount relative to total
personal income tax collections. But the problem is not unimportant.
Supplementto Report, p.6.See note, p.109,this chapter.
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For unreported income may have repercussions more serious than the
revenue loss that is directly traceable toit. Underreported income
constitutes one piece of a broader problem. A general feeling that
some types of income and some particular groups of taxpayers are
not carrying their share of the tax load might undermine the zeal with
which many taxpayers police themselves. We emphasize dividend
underreporting here because that is what we are studying, but other
sources of income are also underreported, some of them more so than
dividends.
3. A review of the gap over the twenty-three-year period, 1936—
1958, did not disclose a tendency for the underreporting of dividends
to correct itself over time. During these years, which witnessed a
revolutionary conversion of the personal income tax from a levy on
very few citizens to one reaching almost every income recipient, the
gap has tended to rise in absolute terms and to be relatively about as
important near the end of the period as at its beginning.
4. An examination of the year-to-year changes in the dividend gap
suggests that its relative size roughly reflects taxpayer response to
variations in tax rates, especially tax rate increases. Thus during World
War II, the dividend gap rose sharply, whereas it declined as tax
rates were reduced in the several years following the war. But for the
years since 1950, the evidence does not support the conjecture that
higher rates discourage reporting and lower rates encourage it.
5. Estimates from a sample audit undertaken by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue of the personal income tax returns for 1948 suggest
that the most serious underreporting is found among dividend re-
cipients with incomes of less than $25,000. Although, of course, par-
ticular individuals with higher incomes may underreport significantly,
on the whole total underreporting at the higher incomes is not great,
and, in any event, is more likely to be discovered. A more recent
sample survey by the IRS for 1959 confirms this pattern.
6. Dividends, of course, do not stand alone as regards underreport-
ing. Estimates made for other sources of income also show a gap. While
subject to wide margins of error and not strictly comparable, evidence
of other sources of income underreporting rounds out the discussion
of dividend underreporting. For 1957, the following reporting per-
centages have been found (source reference appears earlier in this
chapter):
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Farm operators' income 45%
The sharp differences in coverage percentages creates a presumption
that this ranking, although not the estimated percentages, is very likely
correct.
Technical Note
This note explains in detail some of the estimating procedures and
tests used in developing the data of Chapter 2. It has four sections
covering the following topics: (1) derivation of the dividend gap; (2)
specifying the range of the gap and testing year-to-year changes for
significance; (3) estimates of the amount of dividend underreporting
as disclosed by the ACP, 1948 (Table 21); and (4) estimating the revenue
gain from full correction of dividend underreporting.
DERIVATION OF DIVIDEND GAP
Table 26 presents the adjustments made in each year, while the ac-
companying notes explain how the entries were estimated.
RANGE OF DIVIDEND GAP AND TESTING YEAR-TO-YEAR CHANGES
A Confidence Interval for the Gap
R =Dividendsof individuals and fiduciaries accounted for on tax
returns (line 4 of Table 26).
M =Maximumestimate of dividends reportable by individuals and
fiduciaries (line 14 of Table 26).
G =M—R=Dividendgap (line 15 of Table 26).
Each of the components that make up R, lines 1, 2, and 3 of Table
26, are subject to sampling variability. That is to say, each of the
components of R is a random variable as is, therefore, R itself. Like-
wise, most of the components of M are subject to sampling variability;
hence M is a random variable. And since G M —R,G too is a
random variable. The observed (estimated) M and R are drawn from
a universe of values. If numerous estimates of the lines of Table 26
were undertaken, every time the components of M and R were esti-
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mated we would obtain a different value for each one, a different value
for M and R, and consequently a different value for G. Knowing the
sampling variabilities of these components, we can state an interval
which will cover G (i.e., within which G will fall) to any desired
likelihood. For example, for the confidence interval associated with a
.99 likelihood, one could assert that 99 times out of 100 this interval
will cover the "true" gap. The "true" gap, of course, is not a random
variable; our observed gap is.
The "model" neglecting nonrandom errors of measurement is this:
1. M =M'+whereM is the observed value, M' is the "true"
value, andisa sampling error with a mean of 0 and variance
Q.2tobe
determined from sampling variability of the components of M.
2. R =R'+ v, again R is the observed (or estimated) value, R' is
the "correct" value, and v a sampling error with a mean 0 and variance
3. G=M—R=M'+e—R'—v.
Let E( ) indicate the expected value.
4. E(G)E(M) —E(R)=E(M')+ E(E) —E(R')—E(v).Since M'
and R' are given numbers, their expected value is M' and R' respectively,
while E(€)E(v) =0.Therefore E(G) =M'—R'.
Letbethe variance.
5.4= SinceM'and R'are given
numbers, =4 = 0.Therefore,=+if, as is the case,and
are independent.
6.= +and the confidence interval within which the true
gap will lie 95 times out of 100 is equal to G ± whilethe con-
fidence interval within which the true gap will lie 99 times out of 100 is
equal to G ±
Estimates of the sampling variabilities of the components that are pre-
dominant in determining 0Gweremade available by Ernest C. Engquist,
Jr. of the Internal Revenue Service. Notice how whichis item 1 in
the table dominates the results.
Testing for Significance of Year-to-Year Changes in the Gap
Define a new random variable, G2 —C1,which is the change in the
gap between any two years, usually between one year and the next.
7. +4,andao2_o1 = +4.
Withthis standard deviation, we can test for a significant change in
the gap between year I and year 2. For we can set up the null hypo-
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TABLE
DERIVATION QJ? DIVIDENDS NOT
(million
1936 1937 1938
1. Dividends reported by individuals on personal
income tax returns 3,1743,1882,212
Plus 2. Dividends included in ccOther income" on 1040A
or W-2 returns
Plus 3. Dividends of fiduciaries (estates and trusts)
Variant 1 617 617 454
Variant 2 860 860 626
Variant 3
Equals4. Dividends of individuals and fiduciaries ac-




5. Dividends paid by domestic corporations 7,3797,5145,013
Minus6. Intercorporate dividends 2,6772,6821,791
Plus 7. Dividends received by individuals from abroad 44 56 80
Minus8. Dividends paid to foreigners 220 264 160
Minus9. Dividends received by nonprofit organizations 97 103 71
Minus10. Dividends received by noninsured pension funds 12 13 9
Minus11. Capital gains dividends (paid out by investment
trusts) 20 10 10
Minus12. Dividends included in partnership income 24 25 17
Minus13. Non taxable dividends
Variant 1 63 64 44
Variant 2 67 69 47
Variant 3
Equals14. Maximum estimate of dividends reportable by




15. Dividend gap (line 14 minus line 4)
Variant 1 519 604 325
Variant 2 272 356 150
Variant 3
16. Relative dividend gap (line 15+Iine 14) times 100
Variant 1 12.0 13.7 10.9
Variant 2 6.3 8.1 5.0
Variant 3
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26
REPORTED ON TAX RETURNS, 1936—1958
dollars)
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947
2,544 2,999 3,299 2,833 2,780 2,986 3,010 3,674 4,295
109 151 97 15 16 18 15
555 629 643 558 579 623 674 766 912
747 791 821 824 848 888 889 1,100 1,229
— 781 901 669 750 716 895 1,071 1,140
3,099 3,628 4,051 3,542 3,456 3,624 3,700 4,458 5,222
3,291 3,790 4,229 3,808 3,725 3,889 3,915 4,792 5,539
— 3,780 4,309 3,653 3,627 3,717 3,921 4,763 5,450
5,747 6,089 6,701 5,607 5,728 6,057 6,081 7,497 8,365
1,906 2,021 2,235 1,344 1,334 1,429 1,418 1,713 1,882
68 70 58 51 57 50 47 64 72
193 187 185 160 154 161 163 200 211
87 92 101 97 100 106 106 159 196 ii 11 13 12 13 13 14 24 33
8 8 9 6 8 20 46 73 58
20 22 24 24 25 27 27 41 55
51 60 67 61 57 57 58 57 59
55 62 70 66 63 62 62 61 63
— 62 71 63 60 59 62 61 62
3,539 3,758 4,125 3,954 4,094 4,294 4,296 5,294 5,943
3,535 3,756 4,122 3,949 4,088 4,289 4,292 5,290 5,939
— 3,756 4,121 3,952 4,091 4,292 4,292 5,290 5,940
440 130 74 412 638 670 596 836 721
244 —34 —107 141 363 400 377 498 400
— —24 —188 299 464 575 371 527 490
12.4 3.5 1.8 10.4 15.6 15.6 13.9 15.8 12.1
6.9 —0.9 —2.6 3.6 8.9 9.3 8.8 9.4 6.7
— —0.6 —4.6 7.6 11.3 13.4 8.6 10.1 8.2
(continued)
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TABLE 26
1948 19491950
1. Dividends reported by individuals on personal
income tax returns 4,9715,2466,158
Plus 2. Dividends included in "other income" on 1040A
or W-2 returns 12 10 9
Plus 3. Dividends of fiduciaries (estates and trusts)
Variant 1 993 9151,330
Variant 2 1,3571,3911,701
Variant 3 1,1851,2091,583
Equals4. Dividends of individuals and fiduciaries ac-




5. Dividends paid by domestic corporations 9,3869,56911,553
Minus6. Intercorporate dividends 2,1942,1622,460
Plus 7. Dividends received by individuals from abroad 77 85 91
Minus8. Dividends paid to foreigners 233 248 285
Minus9. Dividends received by nonprofit organizations 234 232 302
Minus10. Dividends received by non insured pension funds 44 47 65
Minus11. Capital gains dividends (paid out by investment
trusts) 35 30 45
Minus12. Dividends included in partnership income 58 57 67
Minus13. Nontaxable dividends
Variant 1 61 61 60
Variant 2 65 66 63
Variant 3 63 64 63
Equals14. Maximum estimate of dividends reportable by




15. Dividend gap (line 14 minus line 4)
Variant 1 628 646 863
Variant 2 260 165 489
Variant 3 434 349 607
16. Relative dividend gap (line 15 ÷ line 14) times 100
Variant 1 9.5 9.5 10.3
Variant 2 3.9 2.4 5.9
Variant 3 6.6 5.1 7.3
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1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
6,056 5,860 5,828 7,269 8,100 8,892 9,432 9,058
8 6 5 6 3 3 3 3
1,331 1,393 1,377 331 320 309 313 317
1,660 1,650 1,721 368 362 356 366 375
1,516
7,395 7,259 7,210 7,606 8,423 9,204 9,748 9,378
7,724 7,516 7,554 7,643 8,465 9,251 9,801 9,436
7,580
11,299 11,263 11,601 11,913 13,592 14,498 14,914 14,952
2,377 2,350 2,389 2,332 2,572 2,688 2,681 2,829
92 85 108 115 140 165 176 179
286 299 320 305 357 378 401 413
320 338 330 390 455 488 505 501
69 99 131 192 210 262 338 402
87 102 83 162 276 365 346 327
62 56 55
60 63 65 70 71 76 110 230
62 65 68 70 71 77 112 230
62
8,130 8,041 8,336 8,577 9,791 10,406 10,709 10,429
8,128 8,039 8,333 8,577 9,791 10,405 10,707 10,429
8,128
735 782 1,126 971 1,368 1,202 961 1,051
404 523 779 934 1,326 1,154 906 993
548
9.0 9.7 13.5 11.3 14.0 11.6 9.0 10.0
5.0 6.5 9.3 10.9 13.5 11.1 8.5 9.5
6.7
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TO TABLE 26
Line 1: As tabulated annually in Statistics of Income, Part 1. For 1944 and 1945, when
a combined dividend and interest figure was reported, dividends were estimated on
the basis of the 1946 ratio of dividends to dividends and interest combined.
Line 2: Estimated for 1944—1956 by taking dividends and interest to be half of
wages and salaries not withheld on and dividends and interest of under $100 on form
W-2 or 1040A returns as given in a footnote to table 2 of Statistics of Income, Part 1
(cf. Selma Goldsmith, "Appraisal of Basic Data Available for Constructing Income
Size Distribution," in Studies in Income and Wealth, 13, PP. 360—361), and then applying
to this figure the fraction that dividends constituted of dividends plus interest for all
returns under $5,000 as tabulated in Statistics of Income. For 1957 and 1958, arbitrarily
put at $3 million.
Estimated for 1941—1943 by applying the ratio of dividends to total property income
(of specified types) on 1040 returns to the property income component of 1 040A
returns.
Line 3: Variant 1, 1936—I 953: Sum of (a) dividend component of individual income
from estates and trusts and (b) dividends retained by fiduciaries. Value for (a) is
estimated annually by applying ratio of dividends to total income of taxable fidu-
ciaries to income from estates and trusts reported by individuals. Value for (b) is
estimated by applying the same ratio used for (a) to the retained income of fiduciaries.
For 1944 and 1945, dividends are estimated from combined dividend and interest
totals on basis of 1946 percentages.
1954—1958: Starting in 1954, dividend component of individual income from estates
and trusts is reported under dividends and shows up in line 1 total. Value for (b) is
estimated from tabulations for fiduciaries in 1954 and 1956 as sum of excluded divi-
dends, fiduciaries share of dividend tax credit blown up to its dividend equivalent,
and an adjustment to take account of dividends not eligible for exclusion and credit.
For 1954, two additional adjustments are needed: (1) Because only 92 per cent of
returns were filed on new basis of IRC of 1954 (this being a transitional year), the
tabulated dividend total was assumed to be only 92 per cent of correct figure and
was adjusted accordingly; (2) credit was applied to dividends received after July 1,
1954, and tabulated credit was raised on this basis to a full year's equivalent. 1955 and
1957 values were obtained by interpolating between 1954 and 1956 and 1956 and
1958, respectively.
Variant 2: Dividends of taxable and nontaxable fiduciaries as tabulated in Statistics
of Income, 1937, 1938, 1939, and 1952. Assumed same in 1936 as 1937. Estimated for
1940—1951 on the basis of interpolation between 1939 and 1952 percentage that divi-
dends of fiduciaries represented of NID personal dividend receipts. 1953 estimated
by interpolation between similar percentages for 1952 and 1954. From 1954 on, same
as variant I above with addition of dividend component of fiduciary charitable con-
tributions estimated by applying fraction dividends comprised of total fiduciary income
to charitable contributions of fiduciaries. For 1944 and 1955, dividend figure was
broken out of combined dividend and interest total by applying 1946 ratio.
Variant 3: Applies only for 1940—1951. Derived by applying values obtained by inter-
polating between the 1939 and 1952 ratios of dividends of taxable fiduciaries to total
fiduciary dividends to the dividends of taxable fiduciaries as tabulated in Statistics of
Income. 1944 and 1945 dividends were separated out from combined dividend and
interest tabulation by using ratio for 1946.
Line 5: From Statistics of Income, Part 2, for each year.
Line 6: Same as line 5.
Line 7: Data that served as basic estimates were supplied by Samuel Pizer, U.S.
Department of Commerce. For 1946—1958, equals dividend receipts on other invest-
ments plus 5 per cent of dividend receipts on direct investments (total investments
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Noms TO TABLE 26 (continued)
abroad equal direct plus other) blown up by division by .85 to get amount before
withholding. In getting the estimate for 1945—1936, the 1946 estimate was computed
as a percentage of total dividend receipts on foreign investment and again blown up
by dividing by .85.
Line 8: As in line 7, basic data were supplied by Samuel Pizer. To his estimates of
dividend payments to foreigners (which were net of tax), we added estimated tax
withheld as supplied again by National Income Division, Department of Commerce,
up through 1954, applying the 1954 percentage of tax withheld to get the remaining
years.
9. Estimated by applying to net dividends (line 5 minus line 6) the ratio of non-
profit organization stockholdings to total stockholdings (net of corporate holdings).
For 1936—1944 total stockholdings were estimated by Raymond Goldsmith (Table F-4
of Appendix F of Financial Intermediaries in the American Economy since 1900, Princeton
for NBER, 1958) for benchmark dates 1933, 1939, and 1945, and interpolated for
the other years in the period; for 1945—1955, estimates were provided by Morris Men-
delson from the National Bureau Postwar Capital Markets study. For 1936—1949,
nonprofit organization stockholdings were estimated by Raymond Goldsmith (A
Study of Saving in the United States, Vol. III, Princeton, 1956, pp. 450, 452) for bench-
mark dates 1933, 1939, 1945, and 1949 and interpolated for the other years in the
period; for 1950 and 1951, similarly estimated on basis of Goldsmith's 1949 figure and
estimate for 1952 in Morris Mendelson, The Flow-of-Funds Through the Financial Markets,
1953—1955, Working Memorandum, New York, NBER, 1959; for 1953—1955, from
this same source. For 1956—1958, the 1956 percentage of total stockholdings was used.
Line 10: For 1936—1951, estimated in essentially the same manner as line 9. Stock-
holdings of pension funds for 1939, 1945, and 1949, from Goldsmith's Financial Inter-
mediaries Table A-10, and for 1952 from Mendelson's Flow-of-Funds; for the remaining
years, estimated by interpolation using the values for these four years and 1933. For
19 52—i 958, estimated as follows from data in SEC, "Corporate Pension Funds," an-
nual releases: yield figures were applied to the pension fund bondholdings and the esti-
mated interest receipts were subtracted from the total of interest and dividends re-
ceived by pension funds. The dividend figure thus obtained was raised by 5 per cent
to take account of omissions in the coverage of the SEC survey.
Line 11: Estimates for 1953—1958 were derived by taking the data of the National
Association of Investment Companies (as published in Investment Companies, A Statis-
tical Summary, 1940—1959) as 96 per cent of the total according to New York Stock
Exchange estimates by Stan West and Milton Leontiades, who explain: ccThe NAIC
membership represents about 96% of the assets of open-end investment companies
and about one-third of closed-end investment companies' and holding companies'
assets. However, the remaining two-thirds of closed-end investment and holding com-
panies are principally represented by the holdings of Christiana Securities and Dela-
ware Realty Company, both of which maintain stable security portfolios and thus do
not distribute capital gains."
Estimates for 1952—1939 were obtained by computing percentage that 1953 estimate
above comprised of the average of 1953 and 1952 realized net long-term gains of
holding and other investment companies as published in Statistics of Income, Part 2;
applying this percentage to average of each year and the year before it,i.e., year
x + 1 and year x; and attributing estimate thus obtained to year x + 1.
Estimates for years 1936—1938 are guesses based on a "reasonable" relation to 1939.
Line 12: Values for 1939, 1945, 1947, and 1953 are from special supplements to
Statistics of Income. For all other years between 1936 and 1953, estimates were obtained
by interpolation using dividends of partnerships as a percentage of the sum of lines
5, 6, 7, and 8.
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NOTES TO TABLE 26 (concluded)
Line 13: Estimates for 1956—1958 were obtained from all reported nontaxable divi-
dends in the Commerce Clearing House's Capital Changes Reporter (tabulations there-
from generously made available by Stan West and Milton Leontiades) increased by
10 per cent for small companies not reported on. The 1958 figure includes the dividend
of "tax-option" corporations which elected to be taxed as partnerships as tabulated in
Statistics of Income.
Similarly, tabulations were made from the Capital Changes Reporter, with $100,000
added for each company noted for which no dividend data were available, and in-
creased by 10 per cent for 1941, 1946, and 1951.
Estimates for 1952—1955 were obtained by interpolation between 1951 and 1956
values. Estimates for 1941—1950 were taken to be the figure for each year that seemed
the most reasonable on the basis of the tabulated 1941, 1946, and 1951 totals.
Estimates for 1940—1936 were derived by applying the 1941 percentage for nontax-
able dividends to total net dividends (line 5 minus line 6). This procedure gives about
the same figures as applying the 1941 percentage of nontaxable dividends to dividends
of investment, etc., companies which in this period were the main payers of non-
taxable dividends.
Three variant measures for nontaxable dividends represent the triumph of principle
over pragmatism. For, in principle, such dividends go to all stockholding entities, and
to individuals and fiduciaries one should impute only a fraction of all nontaxable
dividends. We carried out this principle, in relation to net domestic dividends (the
sum. of lines 5, 6, 7, and 8) for the three variant measures of dividends of individuals
and fiduciaries even though it turned out, in practice, to constitute a numerically
unimportant refinement.
thesis, i.e., assert that the difference in the gap between these two years
is equal to zero; and depending on the level of significance deemed
relevant, we can accept or reject the hypothesis.
Let H0 designate the null hypothesis.
8. H0: G2 —G1=0orG2 =G1.
To test this hypothesis, we measure the normal deviate Z where,
G2—G1
+
If we choose a .05 level of significance, Z must be equal to or greater
than1.961 for the null hypothesis to be rejected, i.e., for the change
in the gap between these two years to be considered statistically sig-
nificant. If a .01 level of significance is chosen, the null hypothesis will
be rejected only if Z12.571.
Thistest was applied to every year-by-year change in the gap for
variants 1 and 2. Almost all such changes were significant except as
noted in Table 1.7.Wealso tested by the same method the difference
between the average gap for 1937—1939 and for 1956 and 1958. The
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TABLE 27





1936—1937 3.18 3.15 1947—1948 —2.38 —3.59
1937—1938 —12.08 —8.92 1948—1949 0.42 —2.21
1938—1939 5.72 4.68 1949—1950 4.52 6.75
1939—1940 —13.25 —11.88 1950—1951 —2.46 —1.63
1940—1941 —2.08 —2.71 1951—1952 0.81 2.05
1941—1942 12.61 9.25 1952—1953 6.23 4.86
1942—1943 9.19 9.02 1953—1954 —3.23 1.54
1943—1944 1.30 1.50 1954—1955 5.75 5.68
1944—1945 —2.92 —0.91 1955—1956 —2.18 —2.26
1945—1946 8.48 4.28 1956—1957 —3.44 —3.54
1946—1947 —3.38 —2.88 1957—1958 1.54 1.49
difference, of course, was significant. Table 27 shows the values of Z,
where Z1 applies to variant I and 4 to variant 2.
In making these tests, as already noted, the variance associated with
dividends reported by individuals was by far the most important com-
ponent of the total variance.
ESTIMATES OF DIVIDEND UNDERREPORTING BASED ON ACP DATA
The estimates of dividend underreporting in Tables 21 and 22 are
based on tabulations of the ACP data made available by the Internal
Revenue Service in 1951. We describe the estimates incorporated in
Table 21.
The estimate of underreporting must be made as a range rather
than a single value because, with only the total tax change reported
for returns with dividend errors, it was necessary arbitrarily to assign
fractions of that total to the dividend error alone. In the ACP tabula-
tions dividend errors were classified as major or minor errors. All
returns that met the following conditions were placed in the major
error category.
1. The error in dividends accounted for the largest portion of the
change in adjusted gross income, i.e., the addition (or subtraction) due
to audit.
2. The change in adjusted gross income was responsible for a bigger
fraction of the total tax change than exemption or deduction changes,
or mathematical error.
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All other returns with dividend errors were placed in the minor
error category.
Following this classification, we set up three possibilities for major
error returns: 100, 75, and 50 per cent of the total tax change due to
the dividend error; and three percentage assumptions for minor error
returns: 40, 30, and 20 per cent. In every case we estimated the divi-
dends not covered by the ACP by dividing the tax change assumed
due to the errors in dividend reporting by the marginal rate that ap-
plied on the average to all taxpayers (taken from Statistics of Income)
in each of the broad income classes by which the ACP data were
tabulated and for joint and separate returns.
The lower value of the estimates in Table 21 is the sum of the 50
per cent for major errors and 25 per cent for minor error assumptions;
the upper values of the range come from adding the results of the 100
and 40 per cent assumptions. The upper value of the range is almost
surely above the actual figure, but it cannot be stated as positively that
the lower limit of our range is below the real value.
Table 22 is derived from 21 and data from Statistics of Income.
ESTIMATING REVENUE GAIN FROM FULL CORRECTION OF
DIVIDEND UNDERREPORTING IN 1958
From Table 21 we derived the income class distribution of dividend
underreporting, applied these percentages to our estimated increment
to the tax base of $900 million that would follow elimination of under-
reporting, and multiplied the amounts thus obtained by the marginal
rates (weighted by the proportion of joint and separate returns) that
applied to the taxable income in each of the broad adjusted gross
income classes. Having the data conveniently at hand, we assumed
that the 1956 marginal rates applied in 1958, hardly a drastic assump-
tion.
A numerical summary of our procedure follows in Table 28.
Note on Difference Between Aggregate Gap and Survey Gap
Earlier it was asserted that our 10 per cent gap and the 1959 Survey's
5 per cent were not necessarily inconsistent. More correctly, using a
.99 confidence interval, our gap of 9 to 11 per cent (8.5 to 10.5 under
variant 2) is not necessarily in conflict with the Survey's 2.5 to 7.5 per
cent gap. For the two sets of estimates are not comparable in many ways.
Rather than elaborate on all these differences, we note here the
Survey features that might tend to understate the gap. For one thing,
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Income Class Each Class Col. 2 Col. 2 (per cent)EstimateEstimate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Under $7,000 34.5 $224 $293 20.0 $ 45 $ 59
$7,000 to $25,000 47.1 306 400 22.3 68 89
$25,000 to $100,000 15.6 101 133 51.7 52 69
$100,000 and over 2.9 19 25 82.5 16 21
Total 100.0 650 850 201 238
1040A and 1040W returns, on which underreporting could very well
be more pronounced, were excluded. For another, some 1099 returns
may not have been filed, and hence no indication of underreporting
would be uncovered. This could be a danger, particularly in small,
closely held corporations. Moreover, the Survey did not cover foreign
dividends on which underreporting might be greater because no in-
formation returns are filed. Finally, for about 16 per cent of the sample
it was impossible to match 1040 returns and information returns. To
the extent that this represented a failure to file, the Survey overstates
the degree of reporting. There are, then, reasons for thinking that
the Survey may have understated the gap, but there is no way of deter-
mining if it actually did and how much.
On the other hand, the unaudited Survey showed a 9 per cent gap;
the audited Survey only a 5 per cent gap. Three points of this four-
percentage-point decline can be explained by dividends reported
under other headings on form 1040. We made no adjustment for this
possibility; on this score, our measure of the gap tends to be too large.
Against this should be put an item not taken account of by our
method—other income reported as dividends, for instance, saving and
loan "dividends" which are not in our aggregate dividend totals, but
which might be reported as dividends on tax returns.
What follows from all this is not clear. In general, the Survey results
do suggest that our measure overstates the gap, but not by as much
as the difference between our 10 per cent and the Survey's 5 per cent.
We have, then, this additional caution which, unavoidably, could not
be worked into the text, because the Survey results came too late.
It is hoped the future surveys, focused more directly on under-
reporting, will permit a more precise statement on the size of the gap.
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